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A. SELF-OPPRESSION:	A	REAL	FORM	OF	HUMAN	AGENCY	When	we	think	of	oppression,	we	tend	to	think	of	a	person	being	oppressed	by	someone	or	something	else:	a	domineering	husband	oppresses	his	wife	or	chil-dren;	the	structure	of	the	labour	market	oppresses	the	already	disadvantaged…	Examples	abound.	But	is	it	possible	to	oppress	oneself?	This	thesis	is	driven	by	the	intuition	that,	although	paradoxical,	self-op-pression	is	a	real	form	of	human	agency.	In	the	cases	that	I	have	in	mind,	an	agent	exhibits	certain	characteristics	commonly	associated	with	oppression:	a	pres-sured,	controlled	quality	to	agency	that	compromises	agency	by	compromising	choice.	The	agent	feels	as	if	she	has	to	act	the	way	she	does,	such	that	the	action	does	not	fully	seem	to	be	her	choice.	Yet,	curiously,	there	is	no	identifiable	third	party	 to	whom	the	oppression	can	be	attributed.	Rather,	 this	seems	to	be	 the	agent	herself:	she	appears,	therefore,	to	be	both	the	oppressor	and	the	oppressed.	Though	self-oppression	is	a	paradoxical	form	of	agency,	examples	of	the	phenomenon	seem	fairly	common.	Consider,	for	example,	the	following	passage,	in	which	a	woman	called	Beth	explains	how,	worried	about	global	waste	and	overconsumption,	she	tries	to	minimise	her	ecological	footprint	on	the	world:		A	plan	presents	itself.	I	will	cook	my	cabbage	in	the	early	hours	of	each	morning,	when	the	electricity	is	charged	at	‘night’	rate:	I	already	rise	at	five	to	boil	a	series	of	kettles,	the	hot	water	to	be	kept	in	a	succession	of	flasks	for	hourly	doling	out	of	 coffee,	 saving	precious	pence	 (and	power)	with	every	 tepid	cup.	 […]	 I	war	my	cabbage	cold	 in	 the	evenings,	 from	 then	on,	which	 fills	me	with	a	kind	of	sanctimonious	despair.	
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	I	cannot	solve	the	global	issues	of	over-consumption,	waste,	and	inequality	–	but	I	can,	at	least	as	far	as	my	responsibility	goes,	not	take	more	than	I	need.	I	will	have	no	part	in	this	wasteful	system;	I	do	not	buy	into	its	rules.	I	will	take	no	apples,	and	they	will	have	no	place	in	me.	My	energy	bills	will	be	minimal;	I	put	no	extra	demand	on	the	system.	I	will	not	want.	(Beth,	2017:	25)			Another	example	can	be	found	in	Shani	Raviv’s	autobiography,	in	which	she	re-lates	her	experience	of	her	eating	disorder:	








controlled	 style	of	 agency.	On	 this	basis,	 self-oppression	differs	 from	cases	 in	which	control	is	lost:	think	of	someone	caving	into	the	urge	to	eat	a	second	slice	of	cake,	or	the	wanton	agent	who	just	goes	along	with	whatever	opportunity	that	arises.	Such	 instances	of	agency	–	 if	we	want	to	consider	them	agency	at	all	–	have	a	very	different	style	than	instances	of	self-oppression:	they	are	impulsive,	whilst	self-oppressed	actions	are	minutely	regulated	and	directed.	(2)	But,	cru-cially,	self-oppression	features	self-control:	it	is	the	agent	herself	who	is	in	con-trol.	Her	actions	are	not,	in	any	immediate	sense,	directed	by	someone	or	some-thing	else:	she	retains	control	over	her	actions.	It	is	not	so	that	a	third	party	is	forcing	the	agent	to	act,	as	is	the	case	when,	for	example,	I	would	hand	my	money	over	at	an	armed	robbery;	and	neither	is	she	manipulated,	brainwashed,	or	any-thing	of	the	sort.	On	this	basis,	self-oppression	must	be	distinguished	from	third-party	oppression	and	other	forms	of	third-party	interference	such	as	undue	in-fluence.	A	second	characteristic	of	self-oppression	is	that	it	features	compromised	choice.	The	exerted	self-control	involves	such	a	pressure	that	it	seems	to	com-promise	the	agent’s	choices:	hence	the	analogy	with	oppression.	This	is	not	to	say,	of	course,	that	all	forms	of	oppression	involve	obvious	pressure,	or	that	op-pression	necessarily	compromises	choice.1	But	I	do	take	these	to	be	common	and	significant	effects	of	oppression,	and	key	aspects	of	the	phenomenon	I	call	self-
																																								 																					1	Surely,	there	may	be	forms	of	oppression	which	do	not	compromise	choice:	it	may,	for	example,	have	a	merely	affective	or	psychological	effect.	Some	people,	who	we	may	want	to	call	oppressed,	may	feel	unworthy	or	unrecognised,	without	this	necessarily	affecting	their	actions	and	so	without	necessarily	compromising	their	choices.		
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oppression.	In	this	thesis,	I	am	invoking	the	notion	of	oppression	to	refer	to	sit-uations	in	which	an	agent’s	choices	are	compromised,	and	it	is	in	analogy	with	such	situations	that	I	describe	self-oppression	as	such.	It	is	also	clear	that	not	all	kinds	of	pressure	compromise	choice:	indeed,	we	often	make	our	choices	under	pressure,	whether	self-induced	or	not.	Some-one	playing	speed	chess	is	under	pressure	to	choose	her	next	move	quickly;	a	fire	fighter	on	the	job	makes	pressured	high-stakes	decisions.	For	this	reason,	not	all	cases	which	look	like	instances	of	self-oppression	necessarily	are.	We	of-ten	act	under	self-imposed	pressure,	but	this	does	not	always	mean	this	pressure	is	compromising	our	choices.	Someone	who	is	very	dedicated	to	a	challenging	project	may	exert	a	considerable	pressure	over	herself,	which	is	nonetheless	not	oppressive.	 There	 is	 thus	 something	 peculiar	 about	 the	kind	of	 pressure	 that	seems	to	characterise	self-oppression,	such	that	it	compromises	choice.	Of	course,	what	it	means	exactly	to	choose	is	also	a	contested	issue:	the	term	is	used	in	many	ways	and	contexts,	not	all	of	them	compatible.	I	use	it	here	in	order	to	capture	a	specific	aspect	of	agency	which	is	hampered	whenever	an	agent	 acts	 under	 a	 certain	 kind	 of	 pressure,	which	 I	 call	oppressive	pressure.	Pressure	 is	 oppressive,	 on	my	view,	 if	 the	 agent	 feels	 that	 she	has	 to	do	–	or	
mustn’t	do	–	certain	 things,	 in	 such	a	way	 that	 it	doesn’t	 seem	to	be	 fully	her	choice.	My	hypothesis,	then,	is	that	the	self-control	exercised	by	the	self-oppres-sive	agent	involves	an	oppressive	pressure,	which	compromises	her	choices.	Of	course,	conceptualising	self-oppression	adequately	will	require	spelling	out	how	exactly	the	notion	of	choice	is	used	here.	In	 self-oppression,	 choice	 is	 thus	 compromised	 in	 this	primary	 sense:	when	the	agent	acts	one	way	or	another	under	such	a	pressure,	she	is	not	fully	
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To	answer	this	question,	I	must	specify	how	I	understand	choice	in	the	context	of	self-oppression.	My	assumption	so	far	is	that	self-oppression	features	an	op-pressive,	choice-undermining	pressure,	but	this	needs	to	be	explained	further.	How	exactly	can	a	pressure	compromise	choice?	In	cases	of	third-party	oppres-sion,	we	can	often	approach	this	question	by	asking	whether	the	exerted	pres-sure	overrides	the	agent’s	will,	thus	in	a	sense	overriding	her	agency.	For	exam-ple,	if	an	oppressive	husband	forbids	his	wife	to	leave	the	house	by	herself,	her	staying	indoors	does	not	seem	to	be	fully	her	choice.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	her	actions	are	not	really	her	own,	but	are	rather	controlled	by	another.	But	if	it	is	the	agent	herself	who	exerts	the	pressure,	this	kind	of	explanation	isn’t	avail-able:	it	is	the	exercise	of	her	own	agency	which	is	oppressive,	so	its	effect	cannot	be	that	agency	is	overridden.	If	I	am	the	one	who	is	in	control	of	my	actions,	this	seems	to	imply	that	my	actions	will	be	the	result	of	my	choices	(and	vice	versa).	Choice	seems	compromised	if	and	only	if	the	agent	loses	control	over	her	actions,	either	due	to	impersonal	forces	or	due	to	other	agents.	In	self-oppression,	how-ever,	actions	are	under	the	direct	control	of	the	agent.	On	what	grounds,	then,	could	her	choices	be	compromised?		This	second	 issue	 is,	 in	 fact,	closely	 intertwined	with	the	 first.	For	 the	question	of	who	oppresses	whom	corresponds	to	the	question	of	how	one	can	ex-ercise	control	over	oneself	on	the	one	hand,	yet	have	one’s	choice	compromised	on	the	other.	So,	in	self-oppression,	who	exercises	self-control,	and	whose	choice	is	compromised?		
D. THESIS	AIM	AND	SCOPE		As	I	described	it	so	far,	self-oppression	appears	to	be	impossible.	The	headline	
	 12	
aim	of	this	thesis	is	to	explain	the	apparent	possibility	of	self-oppression	by	of-fering	a	conceptualisation	of	it	which	is	both	plausible	and	philosophically	satis-factory.	This	conceptualisation	should	establish	that	self-oppression	is	a	logically	possible	form	of	agency,	which	warrants	its	own	category.	My	strategy	will	be	to	carve	out	a	space	for	self-oppression	within	a	tax-onomy	 of	 different	 forms	 of	 agency.	 Self-oppression	 is	 one	 of	many	ways	 in	which	one	can	act,	and	 it	exists	alongside	other	regulatory	styles,	 such	as,	 for	example,	the	one	which	I	display	when	surrendering	to	the	urge	to	eat	a	second	slice	of	cake.	To	demonstrate	that	self-oppression	warrants	its	own	place	within	this	taxonomy,	I	will	spell	out	its	differentiae:	I	will	describe	which	features	seem	distinctive	about	 it,	 and	 set	 it	 apart	 from	other	 regulatory	 styles.	This	 should	demonstrate	that	self-oppression	is	indeed	a	distinct	form	of	agency.	In	my	pre-liminary	characterisation,	I	already	spelled	out	two	differentiae	for	self-oppres-sion:	 self-control	 and	 compromised	 choice.	 These	 differentiae,	 however,	 will	need	to	be	spelled	out	both	more	extensively	and	more	systematically.	If	this	conceptualisation	is	to	establish	that	self-oppression	is	not	only	a	distinct,	but	also	a	possible	form	of	agency,	it	must	address	the	two	issues	raised	in	the	previous	section:	who,	in	self-oppression,	oppresses	whom?	And	how	can	an	agent	compromise	her	own	choices?	My	strategy	to	address	the	first	problem	will	be	to	seek	the	right	kind	of	mereology	of	the	agent,	which	allows	for	this	kind	of	internal	constellation.	In	order	to	address	the	second	issue,	I	will	have	to	ex-plain	 how	 choice	 can	 be	 compromised	 without	 agency	 being	 overridden:	we	must	find	out	how	an	agent	may	be	able	to	make	choices,	which	are	nevertheless	compromised.	Together,	this	calls	for	a	mereology	of	the	agent	in	which	one	part	of	the	self	can	function	as	the	controlling	part,	and	in	which	another	part	is	the	
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E.1 The	Notion	of	Compulsion	A	first	notion	which	comes	to	mind	when	trying	to	explain	cases	of	self-oppres-sion	is,	perhaps,	the	notion	of	compulsion,	which	seems	very	related.	In	compul-sion,	on	a	common	understanding	of	the	term,	we	also	have	a	form	of	agency	in	which	choice	seems	compromised	due	to	an	oppressive	form	of	regulation,	exer-cised	by	the	agent	herself.	Self-oppression,	however,	is	distinct	from	canonical	forms	of	compulsion	in	at	least	one	crucial	sense.	Compulsions,	at	least	in	their	canonical	form,	are	egodystonic	–	meaning	that	those	who	suffer	from	them	do	not	identify	with	or	endorse	their	compulsive	actions.	On	common	understand-ings	of	Obsessive-Compulsive	Disorder	–	the	most	common	clinical	example	of	compulsive	behaviour	–	 the	 condition	 is	 experienced	as	unwelcome	and	 irra-tional	by	the	sufferer.	In	the	Diagnostic	and	Statistical	Manual	of	Mental	Disorders	[DSM-V],	for	example,	the	first	criterion	for	OCD	is	the	presence	of	‘[r]ecurrent	and	persistent	thoughts,	urges,	or	impulses	that	are	experienced,	at	some	time	during	 the	 disturbance,	 as	 intrusive	 and	 unwanted’	 (DSM-V,	 section	 II).2	 The	compulsive	agent	thus	experiences	her	own	behaviour	as	alien.	The	cases	of	self-oppression	that	interest	me	in	this	thesis,	however,	are	not	straightforwardly	ego-dystonic	–	the	self-oppressive	agent’s	relation	to	her	behaviour	seems	more	complex	than	one	of	simple	dissociation.	Though	she	may	not	be	exactly	pleased	with	her	self-oppressive	behaviour,	it	is,	somehow,	woven	into	her	self-understanding,	identity,	or	set	of	values.	Beth,	for	example,	wants	to	save	the	planet,	thinking	it	a	morally	valuable	aspiration;	Shani	is	attached	to	the	sense	of	self-worth	she	associates	with	weight	loss;	and	Jaimi	deeply	identifies	
																																								 																					2	See	also	Rachman	and	Hodgson	(1980:	12-21).	
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with	the	role	of	a	mother.	This	is	quite	different	from	common	experiences	of	compulsion,	in	which	the	agent	feels	intruded	by	urges	that	feel	alien	to	her.	Of	course,	the	canonical	compulsive	person	is	also	invested	in	her	behaviour	–	but	in	a	different	sense:	the	compulsive	person	is	attached	to	her	compulsions	be-cause	they	help	her	cope,	for	example,	but	the	actions	themselves	are	usually	no	integral	part	of	her	identity.	In	the	cases	of	self-oppression	which	interest	me,	in	contrast,	behaviours	are	much	more	closely	interwoven	with	the	agent’s	sense	of	self.	 It	is	on	this	basis,	I	submit,	that	self-oppression	often	features	a	form	of	self-control,	albeit	a	complicated	one,	whereas	compulsions,	typically,	do	not.	As	Alfred	Mele	(2001)	points	out,	one	could	argue	that	compulsive	behaviours	do	not	feature	self-control	because	of	the	agent’s	dissociation:		People	 suffering	 from	obsessive-compulsive	 disorders	 fall	 short	 of	 ideal	 self-control,	on	an	orthodox	conception	of	the	disorders.	Standardly	conceived,	one	of	the	defining	features	is	that	the	person	recognizes	[her]	problem	as	a	problem	and	regards	relevant	distressing	thoughts,	urges,	and	feelings	of	[hers]	as	unrea-sonable.	An	ideally	self-controlled	person	would	lack	such	mental	states,	or	at	least	swiftly	eradicate	them	should	they	arise.	(Mele,	2001:	127fn)		We	thus	cannot	fully	explain	the	apparent	possibility	of	self-oppression	within	existing	accounts	of	compulsion.	Though	compulsion	is	certainly	akin	to	self-op-pression,	the	latter	still	seems	to	deserve	its	own	category;	and	we	can	distin-guish	both	forms	of	agency	on	the	basis	that,	characteristically,	only	the	former	features	a	form	of	self-control.		But	I	have	merely	distinguished	core	cases	of	self-oppression	from	core	cases	of	compulsion	on	a	common	understanding	of	the	latter.	But,	of	course,	not	
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all	approaches	to	compulsion	conceptualise	it	in	this	way.	One	exception	to	this	common	characterisation	of	compulsion	is	found	in	David	Shapiro	(1981).	In	his	book	Autonomy	and	Rigid	Character,	he	examines	what	he	calls	‘rigid	character’,	a	certain	type	of	behaviour	of	which	obsessive-compulsive	behaviour	is	a	primal	example.	Crucially,	on	Shapiro’s	picture,	rigid	behaviour	does	involve	an	identi-fication	of	the	agent	with	her	rigid	self-regulation:	‘Even	if	it	is	true’,	he	writes,	‘that	the	rigid	person	lives	under	the	authority	of	[her	self-imposed	regime],	it	is	also	true	that	[s]he	[her]self	imposes	that	authority,	that	[s]he	respects	it,	iden-tifies	its	aims	and	purposes	as	[her]	own’	(Shapiro,	1981:	73-74).	Thus,	 on	 Shapiro’s	 picture,	 rigid	 behaviour	does	 involve	 identification	with	the	compulsive	behaviour,	and	thus	a	form	of	self-control.	Is	he,	therefore,	offering	an	explanation	of	self-oppression?	Not	quite.	For,	on	Shapiro’s	descrip-tion,	this	identification	is	something	the	agent	herself	is	unaware	of.	Though	she	is,	for	Shapiro,	actually	exerting	self-control,	she	will	feel	as	if	she	isn’t	because	she	does	not	realise	that	her	compulsions	reflect	her	truest	desires.	Shapiro	as-serts	that	‘the	rigid	person	experiences	weakness	of	self-control	when	the	direc-tives	of	[her]	will,	which	[s]he	identifies	as	[her]	wish,	are	contrary	to	[her]	ac-
tual	but	unrecognized	wish	and	intention’	(Shapiro,	1981:	71).	The	agent,	in	other	words,	fails	to	recognise	that	she	does	actually	want	to	do	the	compulsive	things	which,	on	a	conscious	level,	she	dissociates	from.	As	such,	the	dissociation	expe-rienced	by	the	compulsive	agent,	according	to	Shapiro,	is	false	at	a	deeper	level:	though	she	experiences	a	weakness	of	self-control,	he	contends,	this	agent	is	ef-fectively	exercising	self-control.	Yet	Shapiro’s	account	of	rigid	character	cannot	fully	explain	the	possibil-ity	of	self-oppression	either.	First	of	all,	I	have	my	reservations	about	Shapiro’s	
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set	of	assumptions	in	this	context.	If	at	all	possible,	I	will	avoid	speculation	about	actual	but	unrecognized	wishes	and	intentions,	and	take	the	identifications	and	dissociations	 of	 an	 agent	 at	 face	 value.	 My	 reservations	 about	 Shapiro’s	 ap-proach,	however,	are	not	the	main	 issue	here.	Most	 important	 is	 the	fact	 that,	since	the	self-control	featured	in	rigid	character	is	‘unrecognised’,	Shapiro’s	com-pulsive	agent	does	experience	dissociation	on	Shapiro’s	characterisation.	Shapiro	thinks	this	dissociation	is	only	superficial,	and	dissolves	once	we	venture	into	the	subconscious	depths	of	the	agent’s	psychology	–	but	this	does	not	take	away	from	the	fact	that	compulsion	features	an	experience	of	dissociation	on	his	ac-count.	The	phenomenon	Shapiro	is	trying	to	explain	is,	therefore,	still	compulsion	on	the	common	understanding,	and	after	all	distinct	from	the	kind	of	cases	I	de-scribed	as	self-oppression.	Even	if	we	would	concede	that	compulsive	behaviour	may	involve	an	unrecognised	form	of	self-control,	the	cases	of	self-oppression	I	want	to	explain	do	not	feature	the	kind	of	experienced	dissociation	that	compul-sion	 does.	 On	 this	 basis,	 we	 cannot	 explain	 them	 away	 as	 instances	 of	 what	Shapiro	calls	rigid	character.		
E.2 Internalised	Oppression	Another	possibility	to	consider	is	that	cases	of	self-oppression	may	in	fact	be	in-stances	of	internalised	oppression.	When	faced	with	examples	of	self-oppression,	one	may	think	the	oppression	can	be	traced	back	to	other	people,	or	to	imper-sonal	social	 forces:	 there	may	be	systematic	social	pressures	at	work	that	are	ultimately	the	source	of	the	self-oppression.	I	agree	that	this	may	be	so	in	some,	or	even	all,	cases	of	self-oppression.	Notwithstanding,	I	want	to	resist	explaining	
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away	all	 cases	of	 self-oppression	 in	 reference	 to	 larger	oppressive	structures,	and	this	 for	two	reasons.	(1)	First,	 I	want	to	take	seriously	the	possibility	that	there	may	be	instances	of	self-oppression	which	cannot	be	traced	back	to	such	external	forces.	(2)	Second,	even	when	self-oppression	would	operate	as	a	mi-cro-mechanism	of	social-oppression,	it	is	still	a	paradoxical	form	of	agency	which	deserves	being	analysed	 in	 its	own	right.	Explaining	the	possibility	of	self-op-pression	would	mean	explaining	in	what	sense	we	can	recognise	the	agency	at	work	in	internalised	oppression,	however	paradoxical	it	seems	to	be.	If	we	do	not	want	to	assume	that,	in	internalised	oppression,	the	agent	is	but	a	vessel	for	social	oppression,	we	must	take	seriously	the	question	how	an	agent	can	oppress	
herself.	Internalised	oppression	is	a	category	specifically	designed	to	capture	the	wider	social	structures	at	play	when	an	agent	perpetuates	her	own	oppression.	An	account	of	self-oppression	could	supplement	such	accounts	by	focusing	more	on	the	part	played	by	the	agent	herself	in	such	cases,	and	less	on	the	wider	op-pressive	forces	which	are	causing	her	to	do	so.		For	these	reasons,	 in	this	thesis,	I	will	mostly	bracket	the	larger	social	structures	which	may	or	may	not	be	at	play	in	the	genesis	of	self-oppression.	My	aim	is	to	first	of	all	understand	its	internal,	psychological	structures,	regardless	of	its	exact	aetiology.	Hopefully,	the	model	of	self-oppression	constructed	in	this	thesis	might	be	useful,	in	further	work,	to	consider	self-oppression	as	an	element	of	 social	oppression:	 for	 it	 seems	definitely	 the	case	 that	oppression	often	in-volves,	as	a	micro-mechanism,	something	like	self-oppression.	But	that	is	not	my	aim	in	this	thesis.		
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E.3 Plato’s	Tyrannical	Soul	Lastly,	turning	to	the	history	of	philosophy,	there	appear	to	be	traces	of	the	con-cept	of	self-oppression	as	far	back	as	the	4th	century	BC.	In	The	Republic	[R],	Plato	–	through	the	voice	of	Socrates	–	describes	what	he	calls	‘the	individual	of	tyran-nical	character’,	whose	soul	is	like	a	city	under	tyranny	(R	571a).	In	this	individ-ual,	a	certain	type	of	desire	reigns	freely:	a	desire	which	‘is	a	terribly	bestial	and	immoral	type	of	desire’	(R	572b).	This	desire	is	termed	‘a	master	passion’,	and	is	said	to	have	‘absolute	control	of	a	man’s	mind’	(R	573d).	We	thus	have	a	style	of	self-regulation	 in	which	 an	 agent’s	 own	desire	 exerts	 tyrannical	 control.	 This	control,	 indeed,	 appears	 to	 be	 of	 an	 oppressive	 kind:	 Plato	 does	not	mention	choice,	but	he	takes	freedom	to	be	compromised	in	this	type	of	agent:	‘[Her]	mind	will	be	burdened	with	servile	restrictions,	because	the	best	elements	in	[her]	will	be	enslaved	and	completely	controlled	by	a	minority	of	the	lowest	and	most	lu-natic	impulses’	(R	577d).	Agency	is	compromised	as	a	result:	‘the	mind	in	which	there	is	a	tyranny	will	also	be	least	able	to	do	what,	as	a	whole,	it	wishes,	because	it	is	under	the	compulsive	drive	of	madness’	(R	577e).	Thus,	a	part	of	the	agent’s	own	soul	tyrannises	her	such	that	her	freedom	suffers	from	it.	Plato’s	tyrannical	soul,	writes	Christine	Korsgaard,	‘is	consistently	ruled	and	unified,	though	it	is	not	 self-governed.	 The	 tyrannical	 soul	 is	 a	 slave,	 a	 terrified	 and	 captive	 soul’	(Korsgaard,	2009:	171).	Korsgaard,	indeed,	concludes	from	Plato’s	description	that	‘the	tyrannical	person	does	not	really	choose	actions	[…].	There’s	one	end	[…]	or	act	that	[s]he’s	going	to	pursue	or	to	do	no	matter	what,	and	it	rules	[her]’	(Korsgaard,	2009:	173).	Was	Socrates	–	or	Plato	–	here	describing	something	 like	 self-oppres-sion?	The	tyrannical	soul	displays	a	controlled	quality	to	agency,	which	 is	not	
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may	not	be	self-oppressive,	as	may	a	celebrated	athlete.	My	aim,	in	other	words,	is	to	conceptualise	self-oppression	in	a	way	that	is	content-neutral:	the	charac-teristics	of	self-oppression	which	I	will	spell	out	concern	the	structures	of	agency	only.	This	is	not	to	say,	of	course,	that	there	is	never	any	sort	of	connection	be-tween	the	content	and	the	structure	of	behaviour.	One	might	have	the	intuition	that	certain	kinds	of	behaviour	are	very	prone	to	self-oppression.	Indeed,	I	share	this	intuition	–	and	ideally,	our	model	of	self-oppression	will	be	able	to	track	it	to	some	extent.	It	also	makes	sense	to	look	out	for	examples	of	the	phenomenon	in	these	places.	But	I	want	to	avoid	relying	on	this	intuition	when	conceptualising	self-oppression.	I	conclude,	therefore,	that	Mele’s	brief	suggestion	–	which,	in	all	fairness,	was	only	meant	as	that	–	cannot	help	us	explain	the	category	of	self-oppression.	Of	course,	my	preferred	approach	might	not	be	viable.	It	may	turn	out	that	we	cannot	 coherently	 conceptualise	 self-oppression,	 or	 distinguish	 it	 from	 other	forms	of	agency,	without	taking	into	the	content	of	the	agent’s	behaviour,	or	even	the	status	of	her	mental	health.	But	the	attempt,	to	me,	seems	worthwhile.		
G. THESIS	SUMMARY	
I	will	thus	devise	my	own	conceptualisation	of	self-oppression.	It	must	be	noted,	here,	 that	the	strategy	of	 this	 thesis	will	be	rather	unusual.	Rather	than	being	located	within	one	specific	philosophical	tradition,	it	will	draw	on	four	different	authors,	belonging	to	different	scholarships,	 in	order	to	tackle	the	question	of	self-oppression.	Whilst	the	scope	of	the	thesis	is	too	small	to	do	justice	to	these	scholarships	in	their	entirety,	I	will	demonstrate	how	each	of	them	offers	some	
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vital	source	material,	which	can	be	employed	to	develop	the	category	of	self-op-pression.	 In	 the	 first	 four	 chapters,	 I	will	 collect	 the	 required	source	material	from	the	different	scholarships.	 In	a	 final	chapter,	 I	will	organise	 the	selected	materials	into	an	account	of	self-oppression,	before	applying	this	account	to	two	case	studies.	I	will	start,	in	the	first	chapter,	with	Aristotle’s	theory	of	action.	This	the-ory	forms	an	excellent	starting	point	for	the	thesis,	since	it	offers	a	basic	mereol-ogy	of	the	agent,	as	well	as	a	taxonomy	of	different	regulatory	styles.	Though	his	taxonomy	does	not	include	a	regulatory	style	that	describes	self-oppression,	we	can	use	its	underlying	conceptual	building	blocks	to	construe	an	additional	cat-egory	for	self-oppression:	accordingly,	at	the	end	of	the	first	chapter,	I	formulate	the	category	of	hyperkrasia,	designed	to	capture	the	phenomenon	of	self-oppres-sion.	This	is	not	itself	an	Aristotelean	category,	but	it	draws	on	Aristotelean	re-sources.	I	hypothesise	that,	in	hyperkrasia,	the	part	of	the	agent	which	Aristotle	calls	practical	reason,	and	which	is	by	nature	authoritative,	becomes	authoritar-
ian.	We	can	thus	pinpoint	the	part	of	the	agent	that	becomes	oppressive	in	self-oppression,	which	addresses	our	first	major	issue:	who,	in	self-oppression,	op-presses	whom?	In	consecutive	chapters,	I	will	supplement	this	Aristotelean	picture	with	elements	from	other	scholarships.	In	the	second	chapter,	I	turn	to	the	works	of	St	Augustine.	The	reason	for	this	turn	is	that,	on	Aristotle’s	picture,	we	cannot	explain	how	choice	could	be	compromised	in	hyperkrasia.	On	Aristotle’s	view,	the	 faculty	of	practical	reason	 is	also	 the	 faculty	of	choice,	so	practical	reason	could	not	 coherently	undermine	choice	on	 this	 view.	 In	order	 to	address	 this	issue,	I	introduce	Augustine’s	notion	of	the	will.	On	his	picture,	the	will	functions	
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as	a	faculty	of	choice	separate	from	practical	reason.	What	is	more,	Augustine	also	introduces	the	notion	of	a	corrupted	will:	such	a	will	makes	choices,	but	can-
not	but	make	the	choices	it	makes.	As	such,	I	will	argue,	Augustine	describes	a	way	in	which	choice	can	be	compromised	without	agency	being	overridden.	This	offers	us	the	sort	of	account	of	choice	needed	to	make	sense	of	self-oppression	–	since,	 in	 self-oppression,	 it	 is	 the	 agent	 herself	 who	 compromises	 her	 own	choices.	At	the	end	of	chapter	two,	I	hypothesise	that	a	certain	kind	of	exercise	of	practical	reason	has	the	potential	to	corrupt	our	will.	This	is	not	itself	an	Au-gustinian	idea,	but	it	draws	on	Augustinian	resources.	On	Augustine’s	picture,	 however,	 the	will	 is	 corrupted	 through	divine	punishment.	As	such,	he	does	not	conceptualise	the	idea	in	a	manner	useful	to	us:	for	he	was	not	concerned	with	how	–	if	at	all	–	other,	more	worldly	factors	can	corrupt	our	will.	To	explain	how	our	will	may	be	corrupted	in	more	profane	ways,	the	third	chapter	turns	to	Michel	Foucault,	and	more	specifically	to	his	ac-count	of	modern	domination.	Domination,	on	my	interpretation	of	Foucault,	is	a	specific	and	 insidious	 form	of	oppression,	 in	which	the	behaviour	of	agents	 is	controlled	through	the	control	of	their	own	agency:	domination	does	not	control	agents	by	overriding	their	agency	through	violence	or	force,	but	turns	agents	into	a	certain	kind	of	subject	which	in	turn	leads	them	to	act	a	certain	way.	Joining	together	 two	 of	 Foucault’s	 phrases,	 I	 propose	 that	 domination	 operates	 by	“freezing”	an	agent’s	‘field	of	possible	action’.	Though	Foucault	does	not	himself	speak	of	choice	or	the	will,	I	submit	that	domination,	thus	understood,	corrupts	the	subject’s	will	and	so	compromises	her	choice.	Though	she	may	still	act	and	choose	“at	will”	within	 her	 field	 of	 possible	 action,	 I	 argue	 that	 her	 will	 is	corrupted,	 and	 her	choices	compromised,	 insofar	as	 this	 field	 is	 frozen.	This,	
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again,	is	not	a	Foucauldian	idea,	but	it	draws	on	Foucauldian	resources.	Though	this	does	not	yet	explain	how	practical	reason	can	corrupt	the	will,	it	shows	how	the	will	can	be	corrupted	by	certain	oppressive	structures.	This	brings	us	closer	to	the	idea	of	self-oppression:	might	similar	oppressive	structures	occur	inter-nally,	within	an	agent?	My	hypothesis	will	be	that	an	agent’s	practical	reason	can	corrupt	her	will	by	freezing	her	field	of	possible	action.	But,	before	we	can	piece	together	our	account	of	self-oppression,	some	elements	of	this	hypothesis	require	some	further	elaboration.	Though	he	coined	the	phrase,	Foucault	does	not	offer	any	account	of	a	field	of	possible	action:	he	only	uses	the	phrase	once	or	twice.	Neither	does	he	offer	the	conceptual	tools	to	explain	how	a	field	of	possible	action	might	freeze:	this	is	just	my	interpretation	of	what	happens	in	domination.	For	these	reasons,	the	fourth	chapter	turns	to	the	phenomenology	of	Maurice	Merleau-Ponty.	Drawing	on	his	phenomenologi-cal	account	of	action,	I	develop	a	more	substantial	account	of	fields	of	possible	action	as	consisting	in	perceived	opportunities	for	action,	which	draw	the	agent	toward	action.	I	then	argue	that,	when	an	agent	perceives	opportunities	in	a	cer-tain	way,	this	can	freeze	her	field	of	possible	action:	more	precisely,	this	happens	when	she	perceives	certain	opportunities	as	so	urgent	that	any	other	opportuni-ties	seem	unviable	to	her.	This	corrupts	her	will,	since	these	opportunities	will	draw	her	to	action	with	such	force	that	she	cannot	but	act	on	them.	As	such,	this	compromises	her	choices.	Finally,	 in	a	 last	chapter,	 I	will	present	my	account	of	self-oppression,	which	joins	together	the	materials	collected	in	the	preceding	chapters.	My	final	hypothesis	will	be	 that	a	 certain	exercise	of	practical	 reason	can	 influence	an	
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agent’s	own	perceptions	such	that	it	freezes	her	field	of	possible	action,	thus	cor-rupting	her	own	will	and	so	compromising	her	choices.	This,	then,	is	my	model	of	hyperkrasia.	It	establishes	that	self-oppression,	as	I	described	the	phenome-non,	 is	 indeed	 possible,	 and	 simultaneously	 demonstrates	 how	 it	 is	 different	from	other	forms	of	agency.	As	mentioned,	this	model	is	not	meant	as	to	provide	necessary	or	suffi-cient	conditions	for	hyperkrasia.	This,	however,	does	not	mean	it	is	without	fur-ther	application.	Taxonomy	starts	from	observation,	turning	to	classification	in	an	attempt	to	get	a	grip	on	the	observed	phenomena.	Once	new	categories	for	classification	are	casted,	we	can	then	return	to	the	phenomena	with	a	sharper	lens.	I	will	demonstrate	that	the	proposed	model	of	hyperkrasia	can	help	us	dif-ferentiate	core	forms	of	self-oppression	from	other	forms	of	agency	which	for-mally	share	many	of	its	characteristics.	To	this	end,	I	will	conclude	the	thesis	with	two	brief	case	studies.	We	will	consider	the	case	of	Sam,	an	agent	who	suffers	from	anorexia	nervosa,	and	demonstrate	how	our	account	of	self-oppression	can	explain	some	of	the	structures	of	her	agency.	Next,	we	will	consider	the	case	of	Alex,	a	celebrated	rock	climber	who	keeps	pushing	for	the	extreme.	I	will	demon-strate	that,	whilst	Alex’s	agency	in	some	ways	resembles	that	of	Sam,	his	does	not	count	as	self-oppressive.	Crucially,	this	distinction	is	made	not	on	the	basis	of	what	these	agents	are	pursuing	but	how	they	pursue	it:	the	proposed	account	of	self-oppression	differentiates	it	on	the	basis	of	the	perceptual	consequences	of	their	self-imposed	pressure,	not	on	the	basis	of	the	actions	they	are	pressuring	themselves	into.	Here,	again,	my	aim	is	not	to	articulate	the	boundary	conditions	of	hy-
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A. INTRODUCTION	This	 chapter	will	 consider	Aristotle’s	philosophy	of	 action	as	 found	 in	his	Ni-





neutrality.	Though,	as	we	will	see,	Aristotle’s	taxonomy	is	not	exactly	content-neutral,	we	ca	bracket	any	elements	which	do	not	qualify	as	content-neutral,	and	work	with	its	structural	underpinnings	only.		What	is	more,	these	regulatory	styles	are	formulated	by	Aristotle	in	ref-erence	 to	 a	mereological	 account	 of	 the	 agent.	 Aristotle	maps	 out	 and	 names	some	of	the	main	elements	of	the	human	agent,	and	differentiates	the	different	regulatory	styles	by	describing	different	possible	constellations	of	these	parts.	This	mereology	may	help	us	address	one	of	our	main	issues:	namely	the	question	of	who,	in	self-oppression,	is	oppressing	whom.	Another	reason	why	Aristotle’s	theory	of	action	forms	an	adequate	start-ing	point	is	that	it	includes	a	conceptualisation	of	choice,	and	pays	considerable	attention	 to	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	process	of	 choosing	can	be	disrupted.	The	presence	and	absence	of	choice,	in	fact,	can	be	included	in	the	differentiae	of	the	different	regulatory	styles.	As	such,	his	theory	may	also	help	us	address	our	se-cond	major	 issue:	namely	 the	question	how,	 in	 self-oppression,	 choice	can	be	compromised.	In	the	first	parts	of	the	chapter,	I	will	set	out	the	basics	of	Aristotle’s	the-ory	of	agency,	and	extract	a	taxonomy	of	regulatory	styles	from	his	taxonomy	of	moral	dispositions.	It	will	turn	out	that	this	taxonomy	does	not	include	a	regula-tory	style	that	fits	our	description	of	self-oppression.	Yet,	I	argue,	the	NE	offers	some	useful	conceptual	building	blocks	that	can	help	us	think	about	self-oppres-sion.	More	precisely,	I	will	identify	practical	reason,	the	part	of	the	agent	respon-sible	for	making	and	implementing	our	better	judgments,	as	the	part	of	the	agent	that	becomes	oppressive	in	self-oppression.	I	will	posit	that	practical	reason	can	be	understood	as	our	faculty	of	self-control,	and	that	its	naturally	authoritative	
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his	texts	should	be	read,	and	the	interpretation	I	advance	is	merely	one	amongst	many.	Though	this	interpretation	is	my	own,	at	some	critical	points	I	have	added	support	 from	other	scholars,	 including	Sarah	Broadie	(1994),	Byron	 J.	Stoyles	(2007)	and	Ursula	Coope	(2010).	Importantly,	though,	the	primary	purpose	of	my	reading	is	a	pragmatic	one:	I	turn	to	Aristotle’s	theory	to	extract	some	vital	source	material	for	my	account	of	self-oppression.	And	though	I	have	sought	to	remain	faithful	to	Aristotle’s	text,	the	hermeneutical	validity	of	my	reading	does	not	bear	on	the	larger	project	of	this	thesis.	Naturally,	this	specific	agenda	also	implies	a	certain	focus.	As	mentioned,	I	will	particularly	focus	on	Aristotle’s	mereology	of	the	agent,	his	conception	of	choice	and	how	it	might	be	compromised,	and	some	of	the	moral	dispositions	he	describes.	Settling	on	this	lens	means	that	certain	aspects	of	his	views	will	be	left	out,	or	not	addressed	in	detail:	many	themes,	concepts,	and	ideas	that	feature	in	the	NE	will	remain	largely	or	entirely	untouched.	Finally,	there	is	one	way	in	which	my	reading	of	the	NE	will	be	signifi-cantly	deviant:	I	will	aim	to	make	abstraction	of	the	morally	objectivist	dimen-sion	of	Aristotle’s	views.2	His	theory	of	agency,	especially	in	the	NE,	is	embedded	in	a	normative	conception	of	 the	good	 life.3	My	 focus,	however,	will	be	on	the	
																																								 																					2	 I	 refrain	 from	calling	Aristotle	a	moral	realist,	since	 it	 is	unclear	whether	he	would	attribute	a	mind-independent	existence	to	the	Good.	As	we	will	see,	it	is	clear	that	he	takes	the	Good	to	be	something	which	has	an	objective	validity,	and	he	thus	prescribes	to	a	moral	objectivism.	But	as	I	understand	the	term,	this	does	not	necessarily	make	him	a	moral	realist.	This	distinction,	however,	is	of	no	further	relevance	in	this	thesis.	3	There	of	course	exists	debate	regarding	the	extent	to	which	Aristotle’s	views	are	pre-scriptive,	and/or	embedded	in	a	moral	objectivism	or	realism.	For	discussions	of	these	topics,	see	e.g.	Williams	(1996)	and	Heinaman	(1995).	
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regulatory	 styles	 that	 feature	 within	 this	 description.	 For	 Aristotle,	 as	 men-tioned,	these	different	ways	of	acting	represent	different	moral	dispositions,	but	I	will	single	out	their	structural	features	and	bracket	their	moral	status.	From	now	on,	I	will	simply	speak	of	regulatory	styles	when	referring	to	these	moral	dispositions.	Naturally,	this	approach	has	its	limitations:	the	focus	on	the	good	life	is	central	to	the	NE	and	Aristotle’s	theory	of	agency	more	generally,	and	it	cannot	be	completely	and	consistently	separated	from	his	descriptions	of	agency	as	such.	Bearing	this	in	mind,	however,	I	will	attempt	to	bracket	this	normative	dimension	insofar	as	I	can,	in	order	to	employ	his	theory	of	agency	in	the	specific	context	of	the	thesis.	At	various	points,	I	will	emphasise	the	structural	dimension	of	Aristotle’s	descriptions	of	agency	and	show	that,	for	my	purposes,	it	can	be	sufficiently	separated	from	their	moral	dimension.			
B.1 The	Genus:	Voluntary	Action	We	can	now	turn	to	Aristotle’s	theory	of	action.	A	first	step,	if	we	are	to	spell	out	a	taxonomy	of	regulatory	styles,	is	to	get	a	grip	on	the	genus	to	which	they	all	belong.	When	differentiating	regulatory	styles,	what	kinds	of	things	are	we	dif-ferentiating?	What	is	the	general	category	to	which	they	all	belong?	Regulatory	styles,	of	course,	are	all	forms	of	agency.	Thus,	we	must	first	establish	when,	and	on	what	basis,	the	movements	of	a	person	can	be	classified	as	a	form	of	agency	on	Aristotle’s	view:	what	does	it	mean,	for	Aristotle,	to	do	something?	Aristotle’s	answer	to	this	question	is	fairly	nuanced.	On	the	most	basic	level,	 he	distinguishes	between	voluntary,	 involuntary,	 and	non-voluntary	ac-
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Interestingly,	this	means	that	internal	forces,	such	as	strong	urges	or	in-clinations,	do	not	result	in	compulsory	action	on	his	view:	‘It	is	probably	wrong‘,	Aristotle	writes,	 ‘to	say	that	acts	due	to	temper	or	desire	are	involuntary’	(NE	1111a:	24).	This	might	seem	counterintuitive.	But	Aristotle	argues	in	clear	terms	that	acting	on	strong	internal	forces	is	always	voluntary	and	never	compulsory,	even	though	it	is	tempting	to	assume	otherwise.	First	of	all,	he	contends,	it	would	be	absurd	to	restrict	the	scope	of	voluntary	action	to	include	only	those	of	adult	human	animals:	‘on	this	view	in	the	first	place	the	capacity	for	voluntary	action	will	 not	 extend	 to	 any	 animal	 other	 than	 [humans],	 or	 even	 to	 children’	 (NE	1111a:	26-27).	Secondly,	he	points	out	that	our	inclination	to	treat	compulsory	actions	as	involuntary	is,	in	fact,	an	inclination	to	only	treat	our	bad	ones	as	such:	‘when	we	act	from	desire	of	temper’,	he	asks,	‘are	none	of	our	actions	voluntary?	Or	are	our	fine	actions	done	voluntarily	and	our	discreditable	ones	involuntar-ily?’	(NE	1111a:	27).	This,	Aristotle	argues,	would	be	 inconsistent:	 ‘Surely’,	he	writes,	‘this	is	a	ridiculous	distinction,	since	the	cause	is	one	and	the	same	[…].	It	follows	that	actions	due	to	temper	or	desire	are	also	proper	to	the	human	agent.	Therefore	 it	 is	 absurd	 to	 class	 these	 actions	 as	 involuntary’	 (NE	 1111a:	 27-1111b:	1-4).	The	actions	Aristotle	is	referring	to	here	stem	from	desire	or	temper.	As	such,	 they	are	what	 I	have	called	 impulsive	actions,	which	are	desired	but	not	endorsed	by	the	agent.	Aristotle	does	not	here	mention	whether	there	may	exist	
compulsions	 in	 the	sense	we	nowadays	 tend	 to	understand	 the	 term:	compul-sions,	that	is,	which	are	desired	nor	endorsed	by	the	agent,	but	caused	by	an	urge	she	 dissociates	 from.	Would	 compulsions	 count	 as	 compulsory	 for	 Aristotle?	Probably	so.	I	take	Aristotle’s	point	to	be	that	impulses	are	not	to	be	counted	as	
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compulsory	because	they	follow	our	own	desires.	But	compulsions,	on	the	mod-ern	understanding,	may	best	be	classified	as	a	subspecies	of	compulsory	actions,	caused	by	a	factor	external	to	the	agent,	insofar	as	the	agent	in	question	experi-ences	the	compulsion	to	be	alien	indeed.	Aristotle	mentions	a	second	way	in	which	actions	can	count	as	involun-tary,	even	if	they	are	not	compulsory:	namely	if	they	are	executed	in	ignorance.	For	example,	Aristotle	writes,	‘one	might	kill	someone	with	a	dose	of	a	drug	in-tended	to	save	his	life’,	not	knowing	the	dose	would	be	lethal	(NE	1111a:	13).	For	Aristotle,	an	act	done	out	of	ignorance	is	not	voluntary,	even	though	the	agent	has	 technically	 speaking	 initiated	 it.	 In	 this	 context,	 the	author	 further	distin-guishes	between	involuntary	and	non-voluntary	action.	Actions	done	out	of	ig-norance	are	always	non-voluntary.	But	only	if	the	result	of	an	action	done	from	ignorance	is	undesirable	to	us,	should	it	be	considered	involuntary:	 ‘Every	act	done	 through	 ignorance	 is	 non-voluntary,	 but	 it	 is	 involuntary	 only	 when	 it	causes	 the	agent	 subsequent	pain	and	repentance’	 (NE	1110b:	17-22).	Other-wise,	 the	action	 is	 simply	non-voluntary:	 ‘[f]or	 if	 a	 [person]	has	done	any	act	through	ignorance	and	is	not	in	the	least	upset	about	it,	although	[s]he	has	not	acted	voluntarily	[…],	[s]he	has	not	acted	involuntarily	either,	since	[s]he	feels	no	pain’	(NE	1110b:	17-22).	Note,	though,	that	Aristotle	refers	to	a	specific	form	of	ignorance	in	this	context.	He	distinguishes	between	acting	through	ignorance	and	acting	in	ignorance.	Sometimes,	when	we	are	drunk	for	example,	our	igno-rance	is	our	own	fault.	In	such	cases,	Aristotle	asserts,	we	act	in	ignorance,	and	since	this	ignorance	has	its	origin	in	us,	these	actions	have	their	origin	in	us	by	proxy.	This	implies	that	they	are	voluntary:	‘An	act	is	not	properly	called	invol-untary	if	the	agent	is	ignorant	of	[her]	own	advantage’	(NE	1110b:	25-1111a:	1-
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motivational	power.	It	thus	forms	a	first	part	of	our	mereology	of	the	agent.	The	rational	part	of	the	soul,	equally,	consists	in	two	different	faculties.	Aristotle	divides	it	 into	a	theoretical	and	a	practical	faculty:	he	writes	that	the	‘two	rational	faculties	may	be	designated	the	Scientific	Faculty	[theoretical	rea-son,	 to	 epistēmonikon]	 and	 the	 Calculative	 Faculty	 [practical	 reason,	 to	 logis-





Let	us	first	consider	how	the	rational	part	can	initiate	action.	Because	they	pos-sess	the	faculty	of	practical	reason,	human	agents	are	capable	of	a	uniquely	hu-man	 form	of	 voluntary	 action:	 rational	 or	deliberative	 action,	which	Aristotle	calls	 praxis.11	 This,	 in	 short,	 is	 action	 which	 involves	 rational	 deliberation	(bouleusis).	On	Aristotle’s	characterisation,	practical	reason	is	our	faculty	of	de-
liberation:	it	allows	us	to	consider	different	routes	of	action	within	a	given	situ-ation,	and	judge	which	one	is	best.	In	contrast	to	other	animals,	which	are	bound	to	immediately	and	unreflectively	follow	their	every	inclination,	humans	can	de-liberate	about	what	to	do	(see	NE	1139a:	18-20).	Aristotle	 describes	 in	 detail	 how	 practical	 deliberation	works.	 On	 his	view,	deliberation	is	guided	by	the	question	what	would	be	the	right	thing	to	do.	When	we	act	rationally,	we	are	guided	by	the	ends	we	want	to	achieve:	our	aims	and	 projects,	 the	 things	we	 find	 important.	 Aristotle’s	 term	 for	 these	 is	wish	(boulêsis	–	a	term	closely	related	to	his	term	for	deliberation).12	He	is	clear	that	our	wishes	are	always	things	we	judge	to	be	good.	He	writes	that	‘that	what	ap-
																																								 																					11	Most	translators,	though,	simply	translate	praxis	as	‘action’,	without	specifying	that	it	is	specifically	rational	or	deliberative.	Rackham	explains	in	a	footnote	that	praxis	‘means	rational	action,	conduct.	The	movements	of	animals,	Aristotle	appears	to	think,	are	mere	reactions	to	the	stimuli	of	sensation’	(Rackham,	1934:	328fn).	Though,	at	times,	Aristo-tle	does	seem	to	use	praxis,	and	 its	related	verb	prattein,	 in	a	more	general	sense,	 to	denote	voluntary	action	in	general	(see	Irwin,	2000b:	315).	When	speaking	of	praxis	in	this	chapter,	 I	am	referring	 to	deliberative	action	specifically.	 I	will	 further	refine	my	interpretation	of	praxis	when	spelling	out	our	taxonomy	of	regulatory	styles	(see	section	C	in	this	chapter).		12	From	now	on,	when	I	use	the	term	wish	in	this	thesis,	it	is	specifically	in	this	Aristo-telean	sense.	
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pears	good	to	each	person	is	wished	for	by	[her]’	(NE	1113a:	24-25,	trans.	Rack-ham,	emphasis	mine).	Our	wishes,	then,	form	the	starting	point	of	rational	delib-eration.	This	seems	plausible:	when	reasoning	about	how	we	should	act,	we	are	guided	by	the	question	what	we	think	is	worth	achieving.	We	deliberate	about	what	to	do,	then,	in	order	to	find	out	how	we	can	achieve	 our	wishes.	Wishes,	 on	 Aristotle’s	 view,	 are	 not	 particular	 things	we	want	to	achieve	at	a	specific	time	or	place,	but	things	we	generally	aspire	for.	The	task	of	deliberation,	for	Aristotle,	is	to	select	the	appropriate	courses	of	action	which	 can	help	us	 achieve	 the	 things	we	wish	 for	 in	particular	 situations.	He	writes	that,	in	deliberation,	agents	‘[f]irst	set	some	end	before	themselves,	and	then	proceed	to	consider	by	which	it	can	be	attained	best	and	most	easily’	(NE	1112b:	16-18).	For	example,	 if	 I	wish	for	physical	health,	my	deliberation	will	help	me	identify	those	courses	of	action	which	should	help	me	achieve	this	end:	e.g.	take	the	stairs	instead	of	the	lift,	decline	the	third	glass	of	wine,	or	go	to	bed	early.	Note	that,	for	Aristotle,	‘[w]e	deliberate	not	about	ends	but	about	means’	(NE	1112b:	12).	He	seems	to	assume	that	our	ends	and	values	in	life	are	a	given,	or	at	least	he	does	not	say	much	about	how	we	come	to	have	them.	Our	wishes	can	thus	be	considered	the	‘input’	of	practical	deliberation.13	To	 explain	how	deliberation	works	precisely,	Aristotle	 introduces	 the	concept	of	the	practical	syllogism.	The	practical	syllogism	is	analogous,	but	cru-cially	different,	to	the	demonstrative	syllogism.	The	demonstrative	syllogism	is	a	form	of	theoretical	reasoning:	it	consists	in	two	theoretical	premises	–	a	minor	premise	and	a	major	premise	–	which,	paired	 together,	 result	 in	a	 theoretical																																									 																					13	For	a	discussion	of	Aristotle’s	claim	that	deliberation	is	about	means	and	not	ends,	see	e.g.	Cammack	(2013),	Cooper	(1986),	Thornton	(1982),	and	Wiggins	(1975-6).	
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conclusion.	The	minor	premise	is	always	a	specific	statement,	whilst	the	major	premise	is	a	general	statement.	When	faced	with	certain	specific	statements	(for	example,	 “Socrates	 is	 human”),	 reason	 recognises	 that	 certain	 general	 state-ments	 apply	 to	 them	 (“All	 humans	 are	mortal”).	 The	 combination	 of	 a	minor	premise	with	a	relevant	major	premise	then	yields	a	specific	conclusion	(“Socra-tes	is	mortal”).	In	the	practical	syllogism,	in	contrast,	the	major	premise	is	a	gen-
eral	wish	(for	example,	“I	should	aspire	for	health”).	The	minor	premise	concerns	a	particular	situation	(at	tx),	in	which	different	courses	of	action	are	available	(I	am	offered	a	piece	of	cake).	My	practical	reason	reveals	how,	in	this	particular	situation,	this	wish	may	be	achieved	(by	not	eating	the	piece	of	cake).	Thus,	ra-ther	than	a	theoretical	conclusion,	the	practical	syllogism	is	supposed	to	produce	an	action	(I	refrain	from	eating	the	cake).	In	the	case	of	the	theoretical	syllogism,	Aristotle	writes,	‘the	mind	must	affirm	the	conclusion,	but	in	the	practical	syllo-gism	it	must	immediately	act	on	it’	(NE	11147a:	26-28).	Basically,	the	idea	is	that	in	deliberation,	practical	reason	recognises	spe-cific	situations	as	situations	in	which	a	certain	wish	may	be	achieved.	A	sensory	perception	thus	offers	an	opportunity	to	further	a	valued	end.	Taking	this	oppor-tunity	 is	 the	rational	connection	between	a	particular	 situation	and	a	general	wish:	given	that	I	want	to	be	healthy,	and	given	my	current	situation	in	which	I	am	confronted	with	cake,	the	rational	thing	for	me	to	do	is	not	to	eat	it.	Sarah	Broadie	(1994)	explains	this	point	as	follows:	
The	practical	inquirer	tries	to	identify	a	possible	determinate	action,	the	doing	of	which	would	render	[her]	circumstances,	C,	circumstances	under	which	the	practicable	good	or	best	 is	achieved.	The	chosen	action	 (call	 it	 ‘A’)	 is	 like	 the	theoretical	middle	term	because	it	is	selected	as	mediating	in	practical	fashion	between	the	agent's	situation	and	[her]	objective.	(Broadie,	1994:	225).	
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	The	practical	syllogism	thus	starts	form	a	rational	wish.	It	seems,	how-ever,	 that	 the	 practical	 syllogism	 can	 also	 operate	with	more	 specific	general	rules	for	action,	which	are	not	exactly	wishes,	but	are	aimed	towards	a	wish:	I	may,	for	example,	operate	with	the	general	rule	that	I	should	avoid	sugary	foods,	which	aims	towards	my	general	wish	for	health.	Of	course,	whether	or	not	one	assumes	such	a	distinction	depends	on	how	narrowly	one	wants	to	define	a	wish.	One	could	say	that	I	wish	to	avoid	excessive	sugar	consumption,	just	like	I	wish	to	take	the	stairs	rather	than	the	lift,	and	that	these	wishes	can	be	clustered	to-gether	into	a	higher	level	wish	for	health.	Alternatively,	one	could	say	our	wishes	can	often	be	attained	through	attending	to	general	rules,	and	so	we	often	come	to	operate	with	such	rules	when	engaging	in	practical	deliberation.	These	rules	are	not	 themselves	wishes,	but	adopted	by	our	practical	 reason	because	 they	tend	to	help	us	achieve	our	wishes.	This	seems	to	me	the	best	explanation,	but	the	distinction	is	of	no	further	relevance	here.	We	can	say	that	practical	deliber-ation	always	happens	in	light	of	our	wishes,	and	our	practical	syllogisms	always	start	from	a	general	rule	which	either	is,	or	is	aimed	towards,	a	wish.	In	what	follows,	I	will	speak	of	wishes,	ends,	and	general	rules	interchangeably.	The	task	of	practical	reason	is	thus	to	find	out	how	and	when	to	apply	general	rules.	But	there	seems	to	be	a	problem	with	this	picture.	For	Aristotle	maintains	that	practical	reason	cannot	work	with	general	or	absolute	rules.	For	Aristotle,	doing	what	we	 think	best	cannot	simply	be	achieved	by	 following	a	specific	set	of	rules:	it	requires	endless	practice,	through	which	our	practical	rea-son	becomes	better	at	determining	what	should	be	done	in	each	and	every	spe-cific	 situation.	 ‘When	we	 are	 discussing	 actions,’	 he	writes,	 ‘although	 general	
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formal	end,	i.e.	doing	what	is	best	under	the	circumstances’	(Broadie,	1994:	241,	emphases	mine).14	This	is	always	the	ultimate	objective	of	the	agent,	according	to	Aristotle,	and	this	is	itself	never	deliberated	on.		In	sum,	on	this	interpretation,	our	practical	reason	does	work	with	gen-eral	rules,	but	in	figuring	how	they	can	be	applied	at	tx	it	simultaneously	deter-mines	whether	 it	 is	best,	all	 things	considered,	 to	effectively	apply	 them	at	 tx.	Before	concluding	this	interpretation	of	Aristotle’s	account	of	deliberation,	one	obvious	problem	requires	addressing.	The	term	“deliberation”	seems	to	refer	to	a	fairly	conscious,	and	time-consuming,	process.	But,	most	of	the	time,	we	do	not	consciously	reflect	on	what	we	should	do	–	we	simply	do.	If	deliberative	action	must	feature	deliberation,	it	seems	that	the	scope	of	this	kind	of	action	is	quite	narrow	for	Aristotle.	Does	this	mean	our	actions	are	not	deliberative	most	of	the	time?	This	seems	a	questionable	implication,	since	deliberative	action	refers	to	
																																								 																					14	 Similar	points,	 that	deliberation	 can	be	about	 ends	 insofar	 as	 they	are	 themselves	means	to	the	formal	end	of	the	good,	are	made	by	Cooper	(1986),	Thornton	(1982),	and	Wiggins	(1975-6).	
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rational	 and	 distinctively	 human	 action.	 Surely,	 even	 when	 we	 do	 not	 con-sciously	reflect	about	what	to	do,	our	actions	are	often	both	rational	and	distinc-tively	human:	our	actions	often	still	exhibit	practical	intelligence.	To	my	mind,	the	most	 reasonable	 solution	 to	 this	problem	 is	 to	assume	 that	Aristotle	 con-ceives	of	deliberation	quite	broadly.	Broadie	(1994)	suggests	that,	even	though	Aristotle	depicts	deliberation	as	a	quite	conscious	process,		




all	goes	well,	this	should	immediately	result	in	action:	if	all	goes	well,	for	exam-ple,	I	immediately	decline	the	cake.	Of	course,	as	most	of	us	know,	all	does	not	always	go	well.	Aristotle	recognises	that	human	beings	don’t	always	manage	to	act	as	they	think	they	should.	On	his	explanation,	this	is	down	to	our	appetitive	faculty,	belonging	to	the	irrational	part	of	the	soul.	Like	practical	reason,	recall,	the	appetitive	faculty	has	the	power	to	initiate	action:	‘Desire’,	Aristotle	writes,	‘can	set	the	various	parts	of	the	body	in	motion’	(NE	1147a:	35).	The	problem	is	that	 its	 motivational	 power	 can	 operate	 independently	 of	 practical	 reason.	Whilst	our	wishes	are	after	what	we	think	is	good,	our	desires	aren’t	necessarily:	the	motivational	power	of	practical	judgment	is	connected	to	what	is	best,	whilst	the	motivational	power	of	the	appetitive	part	is	often	connected	to	pleasure.	At	times,	we	lust	for	things	that	aren’t	good.	Though	pleasure	and	the	good	are	not	inherently	incompatible	for	Aristotle,	they	often	are	in	practice,	at	the	level	of	particular	situations:	our	faculty	of	desire	is	often	after	pleasures	that,	at	tx,	do	










C. A	TAXONOMY	OF	REGULATORY	STYLES	Finally,	then,	we	can	turn	to	our	taxonomy	of	regulatory	styles.	In	the	NE,	Aris-totle	describes	a	set	of	moral	dispositions,	which	I	will	study	as	a	set	of	regulatory	styles:	I	will	consider	their	differing	underlying	structures,	and	disregard	their	moral	status.	 It	must	be	noted,	here,	 that	Aristotle	considers	 these	regulatory	styles	to	be	more	or	less	chronic	configurations,	since	they	are	dispositions	of	character:	they	do	not	describe	the	structure	of	agency	in	individual	actions,	but	rather	the	overall	manner	of	organising	action	in	 individual	agents.	Neverthe-less,	these	dispositions	still	describe	how	an	agent	so	disposed	will	be	inclined	to	act	in	every	singular	instance.		In	what	 follows,	 I	 will	 discuss	 three	 of	 the	 dispositions	 he	 describes:	
sōphrosunē,	akrasia,	and	enkrateia.18	Note	 that,	 in	 the	NE,	 these	 three	disposi-tions	all	pertain	to	the	sphere	of	(physical)	pleasure	and	pain:	they	concern	our	self-regulation	in	the	context	of	food,	sex,	sleep,	and	the	like.	I	will,	however,	take	
																																								 																					17	Trans.	Thomson:	‘choice	is	a	deliberate	appetition’.		
18	Aristotle	describes	many	more	moral	dispositions	 in	 the	NE,	pertaining	 to	different	spheres	including	fear	and	confidence,	anger,	and	honour.		
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of	sōphrosunē.	Aristotle	considers	sōphrosunē	a	virtue,	which	is	a	normatively	ro-bust	classification:	only	those	agents	who	have	the	right	better	judgment	can	be	considered	temperate	for	him.	The	temperate	agent,	strictly	speaking,	does	not	only	as	she	judges	best,	but	also	makes	a	correct	judgment.	Aristotle’s	character-isation	of	 it,	 therefore,	also	takes	 into	account	the	content	of	the	agent’s	 judg-ment.	A	more	precise	characterisation	of	sōphrosunē,	in	this	regard,	is	found	later	in	the	NE:	in	book	VI,	Aristotle	writes	that	sōphrosunē	requires	the	right	kind	of	reasoning,	and	a	correct	corresponding	desire	(see	NE	1139a:	22-26).	But	in	this	thesis,	I	am	bracketing	the	morally	objectivist	dimension	of	Aristotle’s	views.	On	my	adapted,	content-neutral	reading	of	sōphrosunē,	its	characteristics	are	simply	that	reason	and	desire	align.	What	the	judgment	of	the	agent	in	question	consists	in	does	not	matter.		So	how	can	we	classify	sōphrosunē	within	our	taxonomy?	It	is	clear	that	it	belongs	to	the	genus	of	voluntary	actions,	since	the	origin	of	action	lies	within	the	agent.	But	what	are	the	differentiae	of	sōphrosunē?	First,	since	action	is	the	result	of	successful	deliberation,	we	must	classify	sōphrosunē	as	a	form	of	delib-
erative	action	(praxis).	As	such,	it	is	also	clear	that	sōphrosunē	features	choice,	since	 choice	 was	 defined	 as	 ‘voluntary	 action	 preceded	 by	 deliberation’	 (NE	1112a:	17).20	But	choice	was	not	merely	connected	to	deliberation	and	practical	reason:	it	also	involved	desire.	But	since,	in	sōphrosunē,	the	appetitive	faculty	is	subjugated	to	reason	and	so	aligns	with	it,	we	can	see	how	this	choice	is	at	once	












rational	desires.	The	idea	is	that,	if	we	wish	for	something	because	we	judge	it	to	be	good,	we	have	a	rational	desire	for	it.	When	we	think	we	should	aim	for	some-thing,	we	must	also,	in	some	sense,	want	to	do	it.	To	support	his	interpretation,	Pearson	 refers	 to	 a	 crucial	 passage	 in	De	Anima	 [DA],	where	Aristotle	writes	about	the	human	soul	that	‘in	the	rational	part	there	will	be	boulêsis,	and	in	the	non-rational	part	epithumia	and	thumos;	and	if	the	soul	is	tripartite	there	will	be	
orexis	in	each	part’	(DA	432b:	4-7).	This	establishes	that	orexis	can	encompass	both	rational	and	non-rational	desires,	whilst	epithumia	denotes	a	non-rational	desire	specifically,	and	boulêsis	denotes	a	specifically	rational	desire.	Crucially,	Aristotle	often	uses	the	more	general	term	orexis	to	refer	to	a	specifically	rational	desire,	distinct	from	epithumia.	This	 solves	our	mystery.	When	we	return	 to	 the	passages	 in	Aristotle	which	appear	contradictory,	we	can	see	that	he	uses	a	different	term	for	desire	in	each.	When	defining	choice	as	deliberate	appetition,	Aristotle	uses	the	more	general	term	orexis.	We	can	posit	that	he	uses	this	more	general	term	here	to	denote	boulēsis,	a	wish	or	specifically	rational	desire.	This	seems	plausible.	Mak-ing	choices	indeed	involves	some	desire	of	sorts,	namely	our	wishes:	they	are	desires	by	practical	reason	for	what	we	judge	to	be	good.	Thus,	choice	is	indeed	connected	with	desire,	but	only	with	boulêsis	(i.e.	orexis	insofar	as	it	is	rational).	Crucially,	then,	when	stating	that	desires	cannot	be	conflicting	amongst	them-selves,	Aristotle	uses	the	word	epithumia.	What	Aristotle	means,	in	this	passage,	is	just	that	an	agent	cannot	at	once	have	an	epithumia	to	φ	and	an	epithumia	not	to	φ:	I	cannot,	at	once,	long	to	eat	the	cake	and	long	not	to	eat	it.	But	one	can	have	
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a	certain	epithumia	to	φ	whilst	rationally	desiring	not	to	φ:	I	can	long	the	pleas-ure	of	consuming	the	cake,	and	at	the	same	time	rationally	desire	not	to	 eat	it.22	For	Aristotle,	the	latter	scenario	would	not	entail	an	inherent	conflict	between	desires,	since	they	are	desires	of	a	different	kind.		This,	then,	is	precisely	what	happens	in	enkrateia:	the	agent	experiences	a	conflict	between	two	kinds	of	desire,	one	rational	and	one	irrational.	In	his	de-scriptions	of	enkrateia,	Aristotle	indeed	uses	the	word	epithumia	to	describe	the	desires	that	rebel	against	reason	(see	e.g.	NE1145b:	14).	Thus,	we	can	differen-tiate	enkrateia	as	follows:	like	sōphrosunē,	it	is	a	form	of	deliberative	voluntary	action,	 which	 features	 choice.	 But	 in	 sōphrosunē,	 the	 agent’s	 rational	 desire	(orexis/boulêsis)	 and	 her	 appetite	 (epithumia)	 align,	whilst	 in	 enkrateia,	 the	agent’s	rational	desire	is	in	conflict	with	her	appetite.			
C.3 Akrasia	This	brings	us	to	our	last	regulatory	style:	akrasia,	often	translated	as	weakness	of	the	will,	or	sometimes	as	incontinence.23	In	akrasia,	the	appetitive	and	the	ra-tional	part	of	the	soul	are	also	in	conflict,	pulling	the	agent	in	opposing	directions.	









erative	action?	This	is	debatable.	At	first	glance,	it	seems	that	akrasia	cannot	be	a	 form	 of	 deliberative	 action,	 because	 akratic	 actions	 are	 generated	 inde-pendently	–	indeed,	in	spite	–	of	practical	reason	and	its	deliberations.	Since	it	is	only	 in	virtue	of	our	practical	reason	that	we	are,	 for	Aristotle,	 capable	of	de-liberative	action,	one	might	want	to	conclude	that	akratic	actions	fall	outside	of	this	category.	This,	however,	seems	to	have	some	strange	implications.	 On	this	read-ing,	akrasia	would	be	a	reversal	to	animal	action:	for	it	would	amount	to	 mere	
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voluntary	action,	in	which	nonhuman	animals	also	take	part.	But	this	seems	too	strong	of	 a	 claim.	 For	akrasia	 still	 is	 a	 distinctively	human	 form	 of	 voluntary	action:	in	both	its	forms,	it	still	involves	rational	deliberation.	In	the	case	of	weak-ness,	this	is	plain	to	see:	for	what	is	distinct	about	the	weak	agent	is	that	she	does	form	a	better	judgment,	yet	fails	to	translate	it	 into	action.	This	sort	of	action,	surely,	does	not	occur	in	nonhuman	animals	–	they	do	not	act	against	any	better	judgments.	Even	though	the	weak	agent	does	not	follow	her	better	judgment,	the	sheer	fact	that	she	has	formed	one	surely	sets	her	kind	of	agency	apart	from	mere	voluntary	action.	Moreover,	this	also	seems	true	for	impetuosity.	Granted,	one	could	argue	that	this	form	of	akrasia	really	is	like	animal	action,	since	the	faculty	of	practical	reason	appears	to	be	entirely	bypassed.	I	would,	however,	argue	against	this	in-terpretation.	For,	as	Aristotle	sketches	it,	impetuosity	is	only	a	form	of	akrasia	because	it	involves	post	factum	regret.	The	wanton	agent,	who	acts	on	impulse	but	does	not	regret	her	actions	later,	would	–	I	take	it	–	not	be	impetuous	for	Aristotle.	Regret,	in	other	words,	is	a	constitutive	element	of	impetuosity.	And	since	this	regret	 is	only	possible	 in	 light	of	rational	deliberation	after	 the	 fact,	impetuosity	 is	 a	 form	of	 agency	which	necessarily	 involves	deliberation.	 It	 is,	therefore,	also	a	distinctively	human	form	of	agency	–	again,	regretting	a	past	impulsive	action	is	a	situation	a	nonhuman	animal	will	just	not	find	itself	in.	Nevertheless,	 it	 seems	 that,	 for	Aristotle,	deliberative	actions	are	 those	which	effectively	result	 from	rational	deliberation,	and	not	 those	which	merely	involve	it.	At	the	very	start	of	the	NE,	Aristotle	makes	it	clear	that	praxis	is	always	
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sia	 is	 not	 deliberative	 for	 Aristotle.	 Our	 next	 question	 is	 whether	 it	 features	choice.	Prima	facie,	it	would	seem	that	it	does	not.	We	saw	that	choice	refers	to	actions	which	 follow	 the	outcome	of	 rational	deliberation.	Deliberative	action	and	choice,	therefore,	seem	to	come	together.	Indeed,	Aristotle	states	that	‘[t]he	irrational	animals’,	which	have	no	share	in	deliberative	action,	also	‘do	not	exer-cise	 choice’	 (NE	 1111b:	 12,	 trans.	 Rackham).	 It	 seems	 to	 follow	 that	akrasia,	which	we	established	was	not	deliberative,	doesn’t	feature	choice.	Aristotle	even	appears	to	confirm	this	when	he	writes	that,	when	our	actions	do	not	follow	from	reason,	they	do	not	count	as	chosen:	the	akratic	agent,	he	writes,	acts	‘not	from	choice	but	in	opposition	to	it	and	to	[her]	reasoning’	(NE	1148a:9).	Notwithstanding,	I	want	to	argue	that	akrasia	can	feature	choice.	Indeed,	Aristotle	explicitly	writes	about	the	akratic	agent	that	her	‘moral	choice	is	sound’	(NE	1152a:	17,	trans.	Rackham).	How	can	we	understand	this	claim?	And	about	which	akratic	agent	is	he	speaking?	The	key	to	understanding	this	claim,	I	sub-mit,	is	to	distinguish	between	choice	on	the	one	hand,	and	chosen	action	on	the	other.	Though	Aristotle	defines	choice	as	voluntary	action	resulting	from	delib-eration,	I	propose	to	understand	choice	as	the	mental	resolve	to	act	in	accordance	with	the	outcome	of	deliberation.	Choice,	on	this	interpretation,	refers	not	to	an	action,	but	to	an	agent’s	commitment	or	resolution	to	act.	Being	the	outcome	of	deliberation,	choice	refers	to	the	moment	an	agent	decides	on	the	best	possible	
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course	of	action	 in	a	particular	situation.	Chosen	action,	 then,	 refers	 to	action	which	is	in	accordance	with	the	choice	one	has	already	made.26	If	we	understand	choice	this	way,	we	can	see	that	one	type	of	akrasia	does	not	feature	choice,	whilst	the	other	does.	Clearly,	impetuosity	does	not.	This	form	 of	 agency,	 recall,	 did	 not	 involve	 any	 deliberation	 before	 action:	 these	agents	‘are	carried	away	by	their	feelings	because	they	have	failed	to	deliberate’	(NE	1150b:	20-21).	It	follows	that	the	impetuous	agent	does	not	make	a	choice	about	what	to	do	–	she	just	acts.	But	what	distinguishes	impetuosity	from	weak-ness,	I	submit,	is	that	the	weak	agent	does	make	a	choice.	This	type	of	akratic,	Aristotle	writes,	 ‘does	not	keep	to	the	resolve	[s]he	has	formed	after	delibera-tion’	(NE	1152a:	17-18,	trans.	Rackham).	This	means	that	she	has	gone	through	a	process	of	deliberation,	and	made	a	decision	how	she	should	act	on	this	basis.	Thus,	I	submit,	she	has	made	a	choice.	The	problem	is	that	her	desires	keep	her	from	acting	upon	it:	the	weak	’deliberate,	but	then	are	prevented	by	passion	from	keeping	to	their	resolution’	(NE	1150b:	20,	trans.	Rackham).27	Thus,	I	suggest,	what	happens	in	weakness	is	that	the	appetitive	faculty	prevents	the	agent	not	from	making	a	choice,	but	from	translating	that	choice	into	action.	When	Aristo-tle	writes	about	the	akratic	agent	that	her	‘moral	choice	is	sound’	(NE	1152a:	17,	
																																								 																					26	 In	 this	context,	 it	 is	also	worth	mentioning	Aristotle’s	claim,	made	 in	book	VI,	 that	‘[t]he	origin	of	action	(the	efficient,	not	the	final	cause)	is	choice’	(NE	1139a	32-33).	If	choice	is	the	cause	of	action,	then	surely	it	does	not	coincide	with	action.		27	Admittedly,	in	these	two	passages,	Aristotle	does	not	use	the	Greek	word	for	choice	(prohairsesis).	But	the	words	which	Rackham	translates	as	‘resolve’	and	‘resolution’	re-fer	to	the	outcome	of	deliberation	–	they	are	forms	of	the	verb	bouleuō,	which	means	“to	deliberate”	 (see	Liddell	 and	Scott,	1843/1940:	324).	On	 this	basis,	 and	given	 that	he	speaks	of	akratic	choice	 in	other	passages	(e.g.	NE	1148a:	9,	1152a:	17),	 I	 take	these	terms	to	mean	the	same	thing	as	choice	(prohairesis)	in	this	context.		
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trans.	Rackham),	and	that	she	acts	‘in	opposition	to	it’	(NE	1148a:9),	therefore,	I	assume	he	is	speaking	specifically	about	the	weak	akratic.	But	whether	akrasia	 involves	choice	or	not,	akratic	actions	are	clearly	never	chosen:	they	are,	in	the	end,	controlled	by	the	appetites	and	not	by	reason.	It	is	for	this	reason,	I	submit,	that	akrasia	is	not	a	form	of	deliberative	action:	it	is	only	when	choices	are	also	 translated	 into	action	that	we	have	deliberative	actions	for	Aristotle.	What	is	distinctive	about	deliberative	action	is	not	just	that	it	features	choice,	but	that	this	choice	is	also	converted	into	action.	This	happens	in	neither	form	of	akrasia.		We	have	now	differentiated	our	two	forms	of	akrasia.	But	there	might	be	a	 significant	 issue	with	 the	 reading	 I	 have	 advanced.	 In	 a	 2007	 paper,	 Devin	Henry	discusses	Aristotle’s	concept	of	weakness,	which	he	calls	‘genuine	akra-sia’.	Genuine	akrasia,	Henry	explains,	presents	us	with	a	more	serious	philosoph-ical	riddle	than	impetuosity	(which	he	calls	‘drunk-akrasia’):	whilst	we	can	ex-plain	 instances	 of	 impetuosity	 by	 pointing	 to	 the	 absence	 of	 deliberation,	 in-stances	 of	 weak	 akrasia	 cannot	 be	 explained	 in	 this	 manner.	 The	 genuinely	akratic	agent	knows	very	well	what	she	should	do.	As	such,	genuine	akrasia	ap-pears	 as	 a	mystery:	 on	what	 basis	 does	 she	 fail	 to	 act	 on	 this	 knowledge?	Of	course,	we	could	say	that	it	is	her	desire	for	an	opposing	pleasure	which	prevents	her	from	doing	so.	But	this	answer,	Henry	argues,	fails	to	explain	the	case	at	hand:	for,	as	we	have	seen,	the	enkratic	agent	(which	Henry	calls	‘self-controlled’)	also	desires	 a	 pleasure	 opposed	 to	 her	 reason.	 This	means	 that	 the	weak	 and	 the	enkratic	agent	share	the	same	disposition,	and	so	this	disposition	is	in	itself	not	a	sufficient	explanation	for	weak	akrasia.	On	this	basis,	Henry	concludes,	Aristo-tle	fails	to	 explain	why	 the	 genuinely	 akratic	 person	 yields	 to	 her	 pleasures	
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whilst	 the	enkratic	agent	doesn’t:	‘genuine	akrasia	cannot	be	explained	solely	in	terms	of	 the	 agent’s	beliefs	because	 [her]	beliefs	 are	 identical	 to	 those	of	 the	enkratic	person	who	exhibits	self-control	 in	the	same	situation’	(Henry,	2002:	267).		 Henry’s	solution	to	this	problem	is	to	posit	that	genuine	akrasia	lacks	in	rational	desire:	‘for	Aristotle’,	he	asserts,	‘genuinely	akratic	behaviour	is	due	to	the	absence	of	an	internal	conflict	that	a	desire	for	the	proper	pleasures	of	tem-perance	would	create	if	the	akratic	person	could	experience	them’	(Henry,	2002:	257).	That	is,	whilst	the	weak	akratic	shares	a	desire	for	bad	pleasure	with	the	enkratic	agent,	she	does	not	have	a	conflicting	desire	for	the	pleasure	that	acting	on	her	better	judgment	will	bring.	The	enkratic	agent,	in	contrast,	does	possess	a	desire	for	the	good.	This,	Henry	suggests,	can	explain	why	the	enkratic	goes	on	to	to	the	right	thing,	whilst	the	weak	akratic	doesn’t.	It	is	through	the	force	of	this	desire	that	the	enkratic	person	can	control	herself:	 ‘the	source	of	the	self-con-trolled	 person’s	 ability	 to	 restrain	 her	 appetite	 is	 an	 opposing	 desire	 for	 the	pleasures	 associated	 with	 being	 temperate’	 (Henry,	 2002:	 265).	 Conversely,	Henry	argues,	 it	 is	 the	 absence	of	 this	 sort	of	desire	which	 leads	 the	genuine	akratic	to	err:	‘the	source	of	the	genuinely	akratic	man’s	inability	to	restrain	his	appetite	 should	 be	 the	 lack	 of	 an	 opposing	 desire	 for	 those	 same	 pleasures’	(Henry,	2002:	265).	Henry’s	suggestion	has	serious	implications	for	my	argument	that	weak	akrasia	features	choice.	Though	the	author	does	not	refer	to	these	notions,	his	claim	 is	 clearly	 that	 weakness	 does	 not	 involve	 any	 rational	 desire	(orexis/boulêsis).	For	this	is	precisely	‘a	desire	for	the	pleasures	associated	with	being	temperate’.	But	since	choice,	as	we	have	seen,	requires	rational	desire	for	
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Aristotle,	this	would	imply	that	weakness	cannot	involve	choice.	Consequently,	Henry’s	solution	to	the	problem	of	weakness	presents	a	challenge	to	my	inter-pretation	of	it.		The	worry	in	dismissing	Henry’s	reading	is	that,	if	we	maintain	that	gen-uine	akrasia	does	involve	choice,	we	cannot	explain	why	the	akratic	agents	acts	differently	 from	the	enkratic	agent.	 In	a	response	to	Henry,	however,	Byron	 J.	Stoyles	(2007)	proposes	a	less	strict,	and	very	appealing,	rendition	of	Henry’s	argument.	One	of	Stoyles’	worries	regarding	Henry’s	suggestion	is	that	it	is,	in-deed,	‘inconsistent	with	Aristotle’s	assertion	that	the	akratic	[person]’s	choice	is	good’	(Stoyles,	2007:	200).	But,	Stoyles	argues,	we	can	hold	on	to	Henry’s	solu-tion	to	the	problem	of	weakness,	without	subscribing	to	his	conclusion	that	the	weak	agent	necessarily	 lacks	any	rational	desire.	His	suggestion	is	simple	and	effective:	we	can	assume,	he	suggests,	 that	 the	weak	agent’s	rational	desire	 is	
outweighed	by	her	desire	for	the	wrong	pleasure,	without	being	entirely	absent.	He	writes	that	‘Henry	has,	perhaps,	overstated	his	case	here	–	it	is	not	clear	that	we	need	to	assume	the	akratic	[person]	lacks	all	desire	for	the	proper	pleasures	of	temperance.	It	could	be	that	[her]	desire	is	simply	outweighed	by	the	desire	for	bodily	pleasures’	(Stoyles,	2007:	199).	Put	differently,	on	this	weaker	read-ing,	akrasia	does	involve	an	inclination	towards	the	good	(i.e.	orexis/boulêsis),	but	an	even	stronger	inclination	towards	pleasure	(i.e.	epithumia).		On	this	interpretation,	we	can	take	the	weak	agent	to	make	choices	also:	‘On	 this	 reading,’	 Stoyles	 writes,	 ‘both	 the	 self-controlled	 [person]	 and	 the	akratic	[person]	choose,	or	form	deliberative	desires	for	a	temperate	course	of	action,	but	 the	akratic	 [person]’s	choice	 is	outweighed	by	 [her]	appetitive	de-sires’	(Stoyles,	2007:	201).	It	is	for	this	reason	that	she	fails	to	convert	her	choice	
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into	action.	As	such,	we	can	maintain	that	weak	akrasia	involves	choice,	but	not	chosen	 action:	 ‘On	 the	 weaker	 version	 of	 Henry’s	 thesis	 considered	 above,’	Stoyles	concludes,	‘the	akratic	[person]	does	choose	correctly,	but	this	choice,	in	the	form	of	a	deliberative	desire,	lacks	sufficient	force	to	overcome	[her]	appetite	for	pleasure’	(Stoyles,	2007:	205).	I	thus	maintain,	with	Stoyles,	that	the	weak	akratic	does	make	a	choice.	This	is	an	interpretation	also	supported,	inter	alia,	by	Broadie	(1994):	‘Sometimes,	she	writes,		







monia,	Aristotle	writes	in	the	first	chapter	of	the	NE,	is	what	all	human	actions	must	 eventually	 aim	 at:	 it	 is	 ‘the	 end	 to	which	 our	 actions	 are	 directed’	 (NE	1097b:	20-21).	Even	though	it	cannot	be	spelled	out	in	absolute	terms	what	ex-actly	this	good	life	consists	in,	Aristotle	does	think	people	can	be	clearly	on	the	wrong	 or	 the	 right	 path	 towards	 it.	 In	 light	 of	 this	 view,	 Aristotle	 thinks	 our	choices	about	what	to	do	can	be	misguided.	In	book	III	of	the	NE,	he	distinguishes	between	a	wish	for	the	good,	and	a	wish	for	the	apparent	good:	‘absolutely	and	in	truth	the	object	of	wish	is	the	good,	but	for	the	individual	it	is	what	seems	good	to	[her]’	(NE	1113a:	24-25,	emphasis	mine).	Our	wishes	and	choices	can	thus	be	right	 or	 wrong	 independently	 of	 what	we	 think.	 Aristotle,	 in	 fact,	 describes	 a	fourth	regulatory	style,	akolasia	or	self-indulgence,	in	which	the	agent	makes	the	
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or	not	this	judgment	is	‘mistaken’	in	reference	to	an	ultimate	objective	good	or	not.	 Thus,	we	can	simply	understand	deliberation	and	choice	as	a	process	and	its	outcome	that	take	place	in	light	of	an	individual’s	idea	of	that	is	good.	Admit-tedly,	this	 implies	a	slight	deviation	from	Aristotle’s	view.	But	 it	 is	only	slight.	The	most	 significant	 implication	 for	our	 taxonomy	 is	perhaps	 that	bracketing	this	 morally	 objectivist	 dimension	 of	 akolasia	 dissolves	 its	 distinction	 with	







notion.	As	I	see	it,	we	should	understand	self-control	as	the	ability	to	act	in	ac-cordance	with	one’s	better	judgment:	the	self-controlled	agent	is	the	agent	who	manages	 to	 act	 as	 she	 thinks	 she	 should.	 Within	 Aristotle’s	 framework,	 this	means	that	practical	reason	 is	our	 faculty	of	self-control.	Actions	are	self-con-trolled	if	and	only	if	they	are	controlled	by	practical	reason.	This	means,	in	turn,	that	self-control	is	exclusive	to	the	class	of	deliberative	actions.	On	 this	picture,	neither	 type	of	akrasia	 features	self-control.	Since	 the	akratic	agent	acts	against	her	reason,	she	does	not	exhibit	self-control.	In	fact,	“akrasia”	is	a	conjunction	of	krateia,	the	Greek	word	for	‘power’,	and	the	prefix	
a,	which	indicates	an	absence.28	In	akrasia,	practical	reason	is	not	 in	power,	 it	does	not	control	action.	When	we	succumb	to	our	desires,	self-control	is	lost.	In	contrast,	 both	 sōphrosunē	 and	 enkrateia	 feature	 self-control.	 In	 the	 case	 of	











Admittedly,	it	is	unclear	whether	the	anaisthetic	agent	fails	to	abide	by	her	own	principle,	or	whether	she	fails	to	do	what	is	best	in	reference	to	Aristo-tle’s	objective	standard.	Aristotle	mentions	anaisthesia	twice	in	the	NE.	In	book	VII,	as	we	have	seen,	he	presents	it	as	the	counterpart	of	akrasia.	But	in	book	II,	he	presents	it	as	the	counterpart	of	akolasia,	in	which,	recall,	the	agent	mistak-enly	 thinks	 one	 ought	 to	 always	 pursue	 pleasure.	 This	 suggests	 that	 the	anaisthetic	agent,	conversely,	mistakenly	 judges	that	pleasure	ought	not	to	be	pursued	at	all.	This	would	mean	that	the	anaisthetic	agent	is	defective	in	her	re-sponse	to	pleasures	not	by	her	own	judgment,	but	by	Aristotle’s	objectivist	judg-ment	about	the	right	amount	of	pleasure	required	for	the	good	life.	On	this	pic-ture,	the	anaisthetic	agent	does	exercise	self-control	–	just	in	a	way	which	Aris-totle	deems	objectively	excessive.	On	this	reading,	however,	anaisthesia	is	a	reg-ulatory	style	which,	just	like	self-indulgence,	is	grounded	in	the	moral	objectiv-ism	that	I	am	bracketing.	The	category	of	anaisthesia,	therefore,	cannot	help	us	conceptualise	self-oppression	on	either	interpretation.	But	most	 importantly,	 on	 either	 interpretation,	 the	 phenomenon	 this	category	attempts	to	capture	seems	different	from	that	of	self-oppression.	For	a	deeply	insensitive	agent	would	not	regulate	herself	with	the	urgent	kind	of	pres-sure	which	characterises	self-oppression.	The	anaisthetic	agent,	as	Aristotle	de-scribes	her,	does	not	want	enough	–	whilst	the	self-oppressive	agent,	if	anything,	wants	 too	much.	 She	 is	 hyper-motivated,	 rather	 than	 under-motivated.	 If	my	sketch	 of	 the	 anaisthetic	 agent	 as	 depressive	 and	 unbothered	 is	 correct,	 she	seems	far	removed	from	the	self-oppressive	agent.		
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	He	also	writes	that	the	rational	part	‘is	thought	to	rule	and	lead	us	by	nature’	(NE	1177a:	13-16,	trans.	Rackham),	and	repeatedly	describes	this	part	as	‘the	most	dominant	part’	 in	us	(NE	1168b:	34,	 trans.	Rackham).	When	we	exercise	self-control,	we	indeed	feel	the	weight	of	our	self-prescribed	rules,	exerting	a	certain	pressure.	My	assumption,	then,	is	that	this	quality	of	practical	reason	is	liable	to	excess:	its	authority	runs	the	danger,	that	is,	of	becoming	authoritarian.	The	very	self-relation	that	makes	self-control	possible	can	turn	oppressive.	And	this,	I	sub-mit,	is	what	happens	in	self-oppression.	How	might	we	imagine	this?	My	proposal	is	that,	in	self-oppression,	the	agent	places	extreme	value	upon	a	certain	end,	or	set	of	ends.	That	is,	she	has	a	set	of	extremely	powerful	wishes.	As	a	result,	the	agent	feels	an	extreme	pressure	to	achieve	these	ends	whenever	she	can:	if	there	are	any	means	available,	she	will	feel	like	she	must	take	them.	Normally,	as	we	have	seen,	a	wish	is	a	general	preference.	 It	 functions	as	 the	general	 rule	 that	 something	 is	worth	pursuing.	Part	of	the	function	of	practical	reason,	as	we	saw,	is	to	assess	not	only	how	it	can	be	 applied,	 but	 also	when	 it	 should	 be:	 practical	 reason	 assesses,	 that	 is,	when	a	general	wish	 is	effectively	worth	pursuing	 in	practice.	 In	hyperkrasia,	however,	 the	wishes	are	so	powerful	 that	practical	 reason	will	almost	always	judge	them	worth	applying:	the	agent	will	pursue	this	wish,	or	set	of	wishes,	al-most	whenever	she	can.	This	means	she	will	tend	to	pursue	these	ends	at	the	cost	of	other	ends.	When	several	different	rules	may	be	applied	at	tx,	and	one	of	them	is	a	rule	she	is	fixated	on,	she	will	feel	pressured	to	pursue	this	one	over	others.	What	is	more,	given	her	fixation	on	these	ends,	the	self-oppressive	agent	may	find	ever	more	
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is	oppressing	whom	in	self-oppression?	For	we	can	now,	thanks	to	Aristotle’s	mer-eology	of	the	agent,	identify	practical	reason	as	the	specific	part	of	the	agent	that	is	oppressive	(that	is,	as	the	part	of	the	self	operating	in	the	nominative	mode).	There	 is,	however,	a	significant	 issue	with	the	concept	of	hyperkrasia.	Within	Aristotle’s	 framework,	 it	 is	a	conceptual	 impossibility.	 I	have	suggested	that,	in	hyperkrasia,	choice	would	be	compromised	due	to	the	sway	of	practical	reason.	Underpinning	the	concept	of	hyperkrasia,	therefore,	is	the	assumption	that	practical	reason	can,	as	much	as	impulses	and	undue	influences,	undermine	choice.	But	this	assumption	is	explicitly	at	odds	with	Aristotle’s	understanding	of	choice.	Actions,	for	Aristotle,	are	chosen	if	and	only	if	they	are	controlled	by	practical	reason:	as	soon	as	an	agent	manages	to	act	in	accordance	with	practical	reason	–	 that	 is,	 as	 soon	 as	 she	 exercises	 self-control	 –	 she	 is	 translating	her	
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choice	into	action.	Any	action	which	is	controlled	by	practical	reason	is,	there-fore,	necessarily	chosen	on	his	view.	Thus,	as	the	attentive	reader	may	have	al-ready	figured,	to	exercise	self-control	as	I	understand	it	simply	is,	on	Aristotle’s	framework,	to	translate	one’s	choice	into	action.	All	deliberative	action	is,	there-fore,	by	default	the	result	of	choice.	Though	there	can	be	choice	without	self-con-trol	(as	happens	in	weak	akrasia),	for	Aristotle	there	cannot	be	self-control	with-out	 choice.	 Consequently,	 it	 is	 impossible	 for	 Aristotle	 that	 practical	 reason	would	both	control	action	and	compromise	choice.		This	is	not	to	say	that	Aristotle	would	not	consider	hyperkrasia	to	be	a	case	of	agency	gone	wrong.	One	may	 think,	 in	 this	context,	of	an	Aristotelean	concept	which	hitherto	has	not	been	mentioned:	the	idea	of	the	mean	(meson),	commonly	referred	to	as	“the	golden	mean”.	This	notion	plays	a	central	role	in	Aristotle’s	ethics.	He	argues	in	the	NE	that	we	must,	as	a	rule	of	thumb,	strive	for	the	right	balance	between	vices	of	excess	and	vices	of	deficiency:	he	writes	that	‘every	 knowledgeable	 person	 avoids	 excess	 and	 deficiency,	 but	 looks	 for	 the	mean	and	chooses	it’	(NE	1106b:	5-6)	and	that	‘virtue	aims	to	hit	the	mean’	(NE	1106b:	16).	We	shouldn’t	eat	too	much,	nor	too	little;	we	should	be	courageous,	but	not	cowardly	or	brazen;	and	so	on.	In	light	of	this,	one	might	suggest	to	un-derstand	hyperkrasia	as	a	vice	of	excess:	 just	as	agents	should	chase	the	right	amount	of	pleasure,	they	should	perhaps	also	exercise	the	right	amount	of	self-control.	But	this	is	not	a	viable	route	of	argument,	and	this	for	two	reasons.	(1)	First,	this	move	would	rely	on	Aristotle’s	moral	objectivism:	we	can	only	classify	hyperkrasia	as	a	vice	of	excess	in	reference	to	an	objective	measure	of	where	the	golden	mean	lies.	Since	the	hyperkratic	agent	does	follow	her	own	regulations,	her	actions	are	not	excessive	by	her	own	judgment.	(2)	But,	second,	even	within	
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reveal	the	agent’s	underlying	hyperkratic	disposition,	which	 is	present	also	 in	other	moments.	Practical	reason	can	exercise	a	pressure	which	can	properly	be	called	oppressive	even	if	the	agent	does	not	wish	to	go	against	this	pressure	in	a	specific	instance.	The	extent	to	which	this	pressure	is	oppressive	just	becomes	most	visible	in	moments	where	she	does	wish	to	go	against	it,	but	this	does	not	mean	it	is	only	then	oppressive.	In	other	words,	in	hyperkrasia,	practical	reason	compromises	choice	also	when	it	does	not	self-sabotage.		Thus,	so	 far,	we	cannot	explain	 that	or	how	choice	 is	compromised	 in	hyperkrasia	within	the	Aristotelean	framework.	This	means	that,	at	this	point,	the	category	of	hyperkrasia	does	not	and	cannot	solve	our	second	problem:	the	
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question	how	exactly	choice	is	compromised	in	self-oppression.	Relatedly,	and	consequently,	Aristotle’s	theory	also	cannot	fully	resolve	our	first	problem:	for,	on	his	mereology	of	 the	agent,	 it	 is	unclear	which	part	 could	be	oppressed	by	practical	reason.	An	obvious	suggestion	might	be	that	practical	reason	oppresses	the	appetitive	part	–	was	it,	in	fact,	not	in	its	nature	to	do	so?	But	the	appetitive	faculty,	 as	 Aristotle	 sketches	 it,	 is	 a	mere	 animalistic	 faculty	 of	 impulses	 and	urges.	As	such,	it	is	not	the	kind	of	thing	which	can	be	said	to	be	meaningfully	
oppressed.	It	can	be	subjected,	subdued,	controlled	and	overcome	–	but	oppres-



















































interchangeably,	as	lust	(libido)	or	desire	(cupiditas).4	But	next	to	irrational	im-pulses,	our	souls	also	have	a	mind,	our	faculty	of	reason,	which	allows	us	to	reign	these	in:	Augustine	asserts	that	‘the	mind	must	be	more	powerful	than	desire	for	the	very	reason	that	it	rightly	and	justly	dominates	desire’	(DLA	1.10.20.71)	and	that	lust	can	be	‘subjugated	to	the	mind’s	full	governance’	(DLA	1.9.19.69).	Thus,	in	contrast	to	other	animals,	human	beings	can	manage	their	impulses	through	their	reason:	Augustine	claims	that	‘a	human	being	should	be	called	“in	order”	when	these	selfsame	impulses	of	the	soul	[irrationales	animi	motus]	are	domi-nated	by	reason’	(DLA	1.8.18.63).	Clearly,	 for	 Augustine,	 being	 guided	 by	 reason	means	 doing	 the	 right	thing.	It	is	evident	that	the	faculty	of	reason	is	capable	of	distinguishing	bad	from	good,	and	can	dominate	lower	desires	in	light	of	what	is	best.	Granted,	whether	or	not	an	action	is	irrational	for	Augustine	does	not	just	depend	on	the	agent’s	own	better	judgment.	His	theory	of	agency	is,	again,	embedded	in	morally	objec-tivist	assumptions:	he	speaks	of	‘the	law	referred	to	as	“supreme	reason”	[summa	
ratio]’,	which	‘should	always	be	obeyed’	(DLA	1.6.15.48)	and	which	‘is	the	law	according	 to	 which	 it	 is	 just	 for	 all	 things	 to	 be	 completely	 in	 order’	 (DLA	1.6.15.51).	Accordingly,	for	Augustine,	a	human	agent	lives	the	right	 life	when	she	follows	this	eternal	law	through	employing	her	faculty	of	reason:	‘when	rea-son	 (or	mind	or	 spirit)	 governs	 irrational	mental	 impulses,	 a	 human	being	 is	dominated	by	the	very	thing	whose	dominance	is	prescribed	by	the	law	we	have	
























untatis	arbitrio]’	(DLA	1.16.35.117).	It	is	a	bad	will	which	is	the	origin	of	evil	ac-tions:	‘the	mind	becomes	a	slave	to	lust	only	through	its	own	will:	it	cannot	be	forced	to	this	ugliness	by	what	is	higher	or	by	what	is	equal,	since	it	is	unjust;	nor	by	what	is	lower,	since	it	is	unable’	(DLA	3.1.2.8).	By	placing	the	locus	of	agency	here,	he	places	the	origin	of	evil	actions	within	human	agents,	and	not	within	God:	‘Surely	I	find	nothing	I	might	call	mine	if	the	will	–	by	which	I	am	willing	or	unwilling	–	 is	not	mine!	Accordingly,	 if	 I	do	anything	evil	 through	it,	 to	whom	should	it	be	attributed	but	me?’	(DLA	3.1.3.12).	Since	my	evil	actions	are	the	re-sult	of	my	own	choice,	I	am	ultimately	responsible	for	them.5	As	such,	the	notion	of	the	will	helps	address	Augustine’s	principal	worry.	In	more	general	terms,	this	means	Augustine’s	notion	of	the	will	can	ex-plain	the	possibility	of	irrational	choices.	For	Augustine,	every	instance	of	irra-tional	action	implies	irrational	choice.	When	I	do	bad	things,	this	is	never	because	of	a	‘surrender’	to	my	desires:	it	is	because	my	will	has	allowed	it.	There	is	thus	no	thing	as	akrasia	for	Augustine.	Alternatively,	however,	we	could	simply	add	the	possibility	of	weak-willed	action	to	our	taxonomy	of	regulatory	styles,	along-side	akrasia.	If	an	agent	follows	her	desires	against	reason,	this	is	can	either	be	because	she	succumbed	to	an	overwhelming	desire,	or	because	she	willingly	as-sented	to	her	desire.	But	can	this	notion	of	the	will,	and	its	related	notion	of	elective	choice,	

















































































sense,	invoking	the	will,	as	Augustine	does,	marks	an	important	move	away	from	Ancient	Greek	intellectualism,	toward	a	more	voluntaristic	model	of	agency.	It	is	tempting,	however,	to	overstate	this	move.	In	his	account	of	freedom,	we	hear	the	echoes	of	Greek	intellectualism:	if	we	choose	sin,	we	are	not	fully	choosing	freely.	Only	 if	 and	when	we	 follow	 reason	 are	we	making	 full-blown	 choices.	Though	there	is,	on	Augustine’s	model,	a	place	for	irrational	choice,	these	choices	are	by	default	compromised.	We	are	only	choosing	freely	if	we	choose	what	we	think	right.	On	this	reading,	therefore,	uncompromised	choice	is	not	really	elec-tive	either,	as	it	can	only	really	act	upon	the	good.	This,	of	course,	is	a	picture	deeply	embedded	in	Augustine’s	moral	objec-tivism.	Reason,	on	his	view,	refers	to	the	absolute	divine	principle	–	the	order	of	the	universe	as	God	designed	it.	To	receive	grace,	then,	is	to	be	able	to	see	and	do	what	is	right	in	accordance	with	this	absolute	principle.	But	if	we	bracket	this	moral	 objectivism	 (insofar	 as	 that	 is	 possible),	 the	 picture	 is	 as	 follows:	 our	choices	are	free	only	if	and	when	we	can	do	as	we	judge	best.	What	this	requires	is	a	deep	understanding	of	our	own	true	goods	–	the	things	we	find	valuable.	Once	we	have	such	an	understanding,	we	are	able	to	make	free	choices	and	resist	con-flicting	temptations	where	needed.	Of	course,	as	said	before,	some	connection	between	reason	and	choice	is	only	plausible:	the	things	I	rationally	value	should,	normally,	very	strongly	in-form	my	 choices.	 But	 if	 I	 cannot	 but	act	 in	 accordance	with	 practical	 reason,	aren’t	my	choices	compromised?	Such	a	situation,	I	submit,	sounds	exactly	like	self-oppression:	I	am	so	compelled	by	my	practical	reason	that	I	practically	can-














































only	of	positing	limits,	it	is	basically	anti-energy’	(Foucault,	1976/1990b:	85).	As	a	result	of	this	widespread	conception,	we	generally	think	of	power	as	interfer-ing	with	our	actions	directly,	 chalking	 forcefully	 the	 limits	of	what	we	are	al-lowed	to	do:	it	presents	power,	Foucault	writes,	as	‘a	mere	limit	placed	on	[our]	desire	[…],	as	a	pure	limit	set	on	freedom’	(Foucault,	1976/1990b:	86).	Though	the	book	itself	focuses	on	power	in	the	context	of	sexuality,	Foucault	is	explicit	that	 this	 ‘juridico-discursive’	 representation	of	power	 transcends	 this	narrow	context,	and	is	in	fact	pervasive	throughout	Western	societies:	




















C.2 Power	and	its	Effect	on	Agency	As	Foucault	sketches	it,	the	productive	dimension	of	power	is	immense,	complex,	and	manifold:	on	his	view,	the	workings	and	effects	of	power	pervade	the	whole	of	 every	human	society.	Power	 reproduces	 itself	 amongst	all	people,	 in	every	kind	of	relationship,	and	from	there	runs	through	and	shapes	our	entire	reality.	Power,	indeed,	‘is	everywhere’	(Foucault,	1976/1990b:	93).	As	such,	the	produc-tive	dimension	of	power	is	hard	to	capture.	But	its	most	essential	effect	–	or,	at	the	very	least,	the	effect	which	is	most	interesting	for	our	purposes	–	is	that	it	influences	our	agency.	That	its	effect	on	agency	is	at	least	a	key	effect	of	power	for	Foucault	be-comes	very	apparent	in	a	1982	essay	entitled	The	Subject	and	Power.	In	this	es-say,	Foucault	suggests	that	the	essence	of	power	is	that	it	influences	our	actions.	The	 essay	 includes	 a	 section	 entitled	 ‘What	 constitutes	 the	 specific	 nature	 of	power?’,	 in	which	he	defines	a	relationship	of	power	as	a	mode	of	action	upon	
actions:	




The	question,	of	course,	is	how	power	relations	can	accomplish	this.	Fou-cault’s	answer,	 in	short,	 is	 that	 they	shape	our	 fields	of	possible	action:	he	de-scribes	the	exercise	of	power	‘as	a	way	in	which	certain	actions	may	structure	the	field	of	other	possible	actions’	(Foucault,	1982:	789).	This	means	that,	when	an	agent	is	‘faced	with	a	relationship	of	power,	a	whole	field	of	responses,	reac-tions,	 results,	 and	 possible	 inventions	 may	 open	 up’	 (Foucault,	 1982:	 789).	Power	relations	influence	the	horizon	of	our	agency:	they	influence	which	possi-











of	power,	but	merely	its	strategy.	Its	essence	is	that,	through	whatever	strategy,	it	structures	agents’	fields	of	possible	action.	This	 reading	 seems	 consistent	with	Foucault’s	 position	 in	The	 Subject	
and	Power.	Most	notably,	he	remarks	 that	power	may	sometimes	employ	vio-




power:	 the	 strategy	which	 Foucault	 calls	 subjection	 (assujettissement	–	 some-times	 translated	 as	 subjugation).	With	 this	 term,	 he	 refers	 to	 the	 process	 by	which	power	influences	individuals	through	influencing	the	kind	of	 individual	they	are.	Power,	Foucault	writes,	repeats	‘the	formidable	injunction	to	tell	what	one	is	and	what	one	does,	what	one	recollects	and	what	one	has	forgotten,	what	one	is	thinking	and	what	one	thinks	[s]he	is	not	thinking’	(Foucault,	1976/1990a:	60).	This,	for	Foucault,	is	a	key	effect	of	modern	power:	he	states	in	his	lectures	at	Collège	de	France	that	‘it	is	already	one	of	the	prime	effects	of	power	that	cer-tain	bodies,	certain	gestures,	certain	discourses,	certain	desires,	come	to	be	iden-tified	 and	 constituted	 as	 individuals’	 (Foucault,	 1976/1980:	 98).	 ‘In	 other	words’,	he	states,	‘individuals	are	the	vehicles	of	power,	not	its	points	of	applica-tion’	 (Foucault,	 1976/1980:	 99).	 Though	 this,	 on	 my	 reading,	 holds	 true	 for	power	in	all	its	forms,	modern	power	is	perfecting	the	strategy	of	subjection	for	Foucault.	Around	the	eighteenth	century,	he	writes	in	The	Subject	and	Power,	we	saw	‘a	new	distribution,	a	new	organization	of	this	kind	of	individualizing	power’	(Foucault,	1982:	783).		When	 power	 influences	 individuals	 in	 this	way,	 Foucault	 says,	 it	pro-duces	subjects:	 this	 ‘is	 a	 form	 of	 power	 which	 makes	 individuals	 subjects’	(Foucault,	1982:	781).7	The	subject,	on	his	account,	thus	refers	specifically	to	an	




individual	who	has	been	shaped	by	relations	of	power:	hence	the	term	subjec-tion.	Crucially,	Foucault’s	choice	of	 term	here	reflects	 the	dual,	and	 in	a	sense	ambiguous,	position	of	the	agent	who	is	shaped	by	power.	On	the	one	hand,	the	subject	 is	 an	effect	 of	 the	power	 relations	 influencing	her,	 and	passively	 sub-jected	 to	 them.	 But	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 subject	 is	 an	 active	 agent	 with	thoughts,	feelings,	and	habits;	and	it	is	precisely	through	these	thoughts,	feelings,	and	habits	that	modern	power	achieves	its	goals.	Foucault	writes	that	 ‘[t]here	are	two	meanings	of	the	word	"subject":	subject	to	someone	else	by	control	and	dependence;	and	tied	to	[her]	own	identity	by	a	conscience	or	self-knowledge.	Both	meanings	suggest	a	 form	of	power	which	subjugates	and	makes	subject’	(Foucault,	1982:	781).	As	Allen	(2008)	puts	it,	










as	a	woman.	These	 interactions	can	 influence	which	kinds	of	possibilities	will	present	on	Emma’s	horizon:	possibilities	which	are	 traditionally	 linked	 to	 the	concept	of	femininity.	If	Emma	has	been	gifted	countless	baby	dolls	as	a	toddler,	and	is	perpetually	assumed	to	yearn	for	motherhood,	this	may	lead	her	to	be-come	a	mother	–	this	possibility	will	emerge	on	her	field	of	possible	action.	Ad-ditionally,	she	may	learn	to	comport	her	body	in	certain	ways,	keep	her	hair	long,	shave	her	legs,	understand	herself	as	rather	shy	and	bad	at	maths,	a	great	fan	of	pink,	 et	 cetera.	 Simultaneously,	 certain	 possibilities	might	 remain	 hidden	 for	Emma:	let’s	say	that,	at	a	certain	point,	the	possibility	of	becoming	an	astronaut	doesn’t	feature	in	her	field	of	possible	action.	Thus,	her	existence	has	deeply	been	shaped	by	the	social	body	she	exists	in,	and	the	kind	of	subject	she	became	be-cause	of	it.	Emma’s	subjectivity,	and	consequently	her	actions,	are	thus	informed	by	relations	of	power.	In	the	case	described,	however,	power	influences	Emma’s	ac-tions	without	 employing	 any	 repressive	 tactics.	No	one	 is	 directly	 interfering	with	her	actions:	she	is	not	forced	by	anyone	to	shave	her	legs,	or	to	become	a	mother,	and	no	one	is	keeping	her	from	pursuing	a	career	in	space	travel.	It	is	just	that	Emma	sees	herself	to	be	the	kind	of	person	who	does,	or	does	not,	do	these	kinds	of	things.	We	thus	have	an	example	of	modern	power,	structuring	someone’s	fields	of	possible	action	in	a	non-repressive	manner.		





























	We	have	now,	following	Foucault,	characterised	domination	as	a	specific	kind	of	power	 constellation.	 This	 general	 sketch	 of	 domination,	 however,	 does	 not	firmly	establish	on	what	basis	power	here	amounts	to	oppression	–	that	is,	why	precisely	it	is	an	illegitimate,	or	suspicious,	form	of	power.	What	is	it	about	fixed	or	frozen	relations	of	power	that	make	them	domineering?	I	submit	that	one	reason	why	domination,	thus	conceived,	amounts	to	a	form	of	oppression	is	that	it	compromises	choice.	Power,	we	saw,	always	struc-tures	agency.	But	in	domination,	as	I	will	show,	it	structures	agency	in	such	a	way	that	choice	is	compromised.	Accordingly,	I	propose	that	a	power	situation	is	op-pressive	if	(though	not	per	se	only	if)	it	affects	agency	in	such	a	way	that	it	com-














that	are	largely	out	of	their	control,	as	Foucault	does,	is	not	to	say	that	they	have	no	control	over	anything	whatsoever.	(Allen,	2000:	120)			So,	on	Allen’s	reading	–	which	I	endorse	–	the	fact	that	a	subject	is	constituted	through	relations	of	power	does	not	alter	the	status	of	this	subject	as	an	agent.	There	is	thus	scope	for	agency	left	on	Foucault’s	picture:	modern	power	always	affects,	but	doesn’t	therefore	destroy,	agency.	This	means	that	my	strategy,	to	distinguish	modern	power	from	domi-nation	in	terms	of	their	different	effects	on	agency,	remains	available.	But	I	still	need	to	demonstrate	that	domination,	as	Foucault	sketches	it,	can	be	said	to	com-promise	choice.	In	order	to	do	so,	I	will	further	develop	his	brief	characterisation	of	domination	given	 in	 the	 interview,	by	pairing	 it	with	his	notion	of	 fields	of	possible	action.	If	power	relations	structure	an	agent’s	field	of	possible	action,	and	domination	consists	in	frozen	power	relations,	it	follows	that	domination	in-volves	frozen	fields	of	possible	action.	By	implication,	I	propose,	power	amounts	to	domination	when	the	fields	of	possible	action	it	produces	are	fixed	and	inflex-ible.	This	yields	a	slightly	more	substantial	account	of	domination:	we	can	define	it	as	a	power	situation	in	which	power	relations,	through	the	production	of	sub-

















tive.	It	is,	in	a	much	deeper	sense	than	in	repression,	the	agent’s	own.	The	domi-nated	agent	is	still,	in	an	important	sense,	an	agent,	and	a	maker	of	choices.	But,	crucially,	the	horizon	within	which	the	will	is	operative	is	constrained:	for	the	agent’s	field	of	possible	action	is	frozen.	We	thus	have	two	distinct	forms	of	op-pression:	domination	and	repression,	both	of	which	compromise	choice,	but	in	a	different	manner.	 Repression	 directly	 compromises	 choice	 by	 forcing	 certain	possibilities	upon	an	agent.	Domination,	in	contrast,	fixes	its	subjects	into	a	cer-tain	horizon	of	possibilities.	(Of	course,	these	two	categories	are	conceptual,	and	in	reality	the	distinction	may	not	always	hold	as	clearly.)	
	




something	influences	which	possibilities	we	can	see	as	viable.	This	will	restrict	the	scope	of	our	field	of	possible	action,	and	thus	restrict	our	agency.	When	our	field	of	possible	action	is	frozen,	possibilities	outside	of	this	field,	even	if	we	are	aware	of	 them,	will	not	seem	viable	 to	us.	And	this	corrupts	our	will:	 for	 it	 is	forced	to	operate	within	a	fixed	set	of	possibilities.	We	thus	are	dispositioned	to	φ,	in	such	a	way	that	we	cannot	but	φ.	And	the	reason	for	this	is	that	we	practi-cally	cannot	see	certain	kinds	of	possibilities	as	viable	routes	of	action.	This	does	not	mean,	though,	that	this	kind	of	agent	can	just	do	one	thing.	Indeed,	a	whole	array	of	possibilities	remains	open	to	her:	Emma,	for	example,	can	make	different	kinds	of	choices	in	all	areas	of	her	life.	Importantly,	when	a	field	of	possible	action	is	frozen,	this	does	not	mean	that	agency	is	bypassed.	It	is	still,	indeed,	a	field	of	possible	action.	One	way	to	capture	this	idea	is	to	say	that	the	agent’s	will	is	still	operative.	Crucially,	however,	her	field	of	possible	action,	within	which	the	will	is	operative,	is	frozen.	This	means	that	the	agent	is	disposi-





















which	this	effect	is	obtained	may	differ.	Foucault	thus	allows	us	to	further	elaborate	our	account	of	hyperkrasia,	and	my	 proposal	 is	 that	 in	 hyperkrasia	 practical	 reason	 corrupts	 the	will	 by	freezing	the	agent’s	field	of	possible	action.	Before	we	can	examine	how	practical	reason	may	corrupt	an	agent’s	own	will,	however,	we	must	further	unpack	some	of	 the	 ideas	I	have	proposed	in	this	chapter.	The	key	notion	I	will	adopt	 from	Foucault	is	that	of	a	field	of	possible	action.	The	reason	for	this	is	that	this	notion	gestures	towards	a	perceptive	dimension	in	agency,	which	deeply	influences	our	actions	by	shaping	the	horizon	within	which	our	agency	takes	place.	But,	at	this	point,	the	idea	of	a	field	of	possible	action,	and	how	it	can	be	frozen,	is	insuffi-ciently	clear.	A	field	of	possible	action,	consisting	in	the	options	for	action	which	seem	viable	to	me,	is	just	my	interpretation	of	a	turn	of	phrase	only	once	men-tioned	by	Foucault.	To	understand	whether	and	how	an	agent	may	freeze	her	










phenomenal	fields	play	a	key	role	–	offers	something	of	this	sort.1	Loosely	drawing	on	 this	account,	 I	will	offer	a	more	substantial	and	detailed	characterisation	of	fields	of	possible	action.	In	a	next	step,	I	will	explain	how	a	field	of	possible	action,	thus	understood,	may	 freeze.	More	precisely,	 I	will	suggest	 that	when	this	hap-pens,	a	certain	opportunity	is	hypersalient	for	an	agent,	which	means	that	it	solic-its	her	to	act	with	extreme	urgency.	This	has	as	a	result	that	other	opportunities	












general	interpretation	of	the	notion	of	fields	of	possible	action,	and	how	they	can	be	frozen.	For	the	notion	can	also	be	applied	in	a	much	wider	context.	Fields	of	possible	action	–	on	my	view	–	are	not	just	constituted	through	power	relations:	which	routes	of	action	present	to	someone	depends	on	a	variety	of	different	fac-tors,	and	not	all	of	them	can	be	reduced	to	relations	of	power.	My	field	of	possible	action	 can	 be	 informed,	 for	 example,	 by	my	habits	 or	 the	 state	 of	my	mental	health;	as	well	as	factors	like	an	unexpected	snow	storm,	or	the	way	in	which	the	shelves	at	a	supermarket	have	been	organised.	Similarly,	they	can	also	be	frozen	by	things	other	than	power	relations.	From	now	on,	when	speaking	of	fields	of	possible	action,	I	am	doing	so	in	the	general	sense,	and	not	in	the	specific	Fou-cauldian	sense.	In	 order	 to	 construct	 this	 more	 general	 interpretation	 of	 possibility	fields,	we	must	consider	how	they	are	constituted,	and	how	they	can	be	frozen,	not	just	by	power	relations	but	in	general.	It	is	these	questions,	I	suggest,	which	Merleau-Ponty’s	account	of	action	can	help	us	answer.		



























Secondly,	the	content	of	our	phenomenal	field	is	also	determined	by	where	we	are:	our	perception	is	first	of	all	a	perception	of	our	direct	environment,	at	a	spe-cific	 time	 and	place	 (tx).	 Usually,	 I	will	 only	 perceive	 opportunities	 for	 action	which	are	actually	possible	at	tx:	I	must	perceive	my	environment	as	suitable	for	them.2	What	I	can	do	at	tx	heavily	depends	on	what	can	be	done	at	tx.	‘To	exercise	any	motor	skill,’	Romdenh-Romluc	writes,	‘one	must	be	in	the	right	kind	of	envi-ronment	–	 for	example,	 to	exercise	my	skill	 at	horse-riding,	my	surroundings	must	contain	a	horse’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	77).	Note	that	what	a	perceived	environment	will	invite	me	to	do	is	not	just	a	function	of	its	“objective”	features.	The	opportunities	I	perceive,	are	perceived	in	light	of	my	perceived	environment,	not	my	environment	“as	such”:	‘motor	skills	are	not	exercised	in	response	to	the	agent’s	environment	where	this	is	under-stood	 in	merely	physical	 terms.	They	are	exercised	 in	response	 to	 the	agent’s	
perceived	surroundings’	 (Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	81).	My	perceived	environ-ment	is	always	seen	from	my	very	particular	perspective,	and	as	such	imbued	with	meaning:	a	bike	only	invites	me	to	ride	on	it	because	I	interpret	it	as	a	bike,	which	is	something-to-ride-on.	But	one’s	perceived	environment	also	includes,	for	example,	one’s	social	landscape,	i.e.	the	social	and	cultural	meaning	a	certain	setting	has	to	the	perceiver.	Merleau-Ponty	observes	in	The	Phenomenology	of	

























B.3 Urgency	and	Salience	Our	phenomenal	 field	 thus	consists	 in	perceived	opportunities	 to	act.	But,	ac-cording	to	Merleau-Ponty,	we	do	not	just	perceive	opportunities	to	act	as	if	from	a	distance,	seeing	what	might	be	done	at	a	certain	time:	when	we	perceive	an	opportunity,	it	always	already	solicits	us.	It	‘pulls’	us,	as	it	were,	towards	action.	
‘[P]erceived	demands	for	action’,	Romdenh-Romluc	writes,	 ‘immediately	draw	
forth	the	agent’s	behaviour’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	90,	emphasis	mine).	The	agent	does	not	just	perceive	opportunities	to	act,	but	is	simultaneously	and	im-mediately	invited	to	also	act	on	them:	‘at	any	one	time,	the	agent	does	not	per-ceive	 their	 surroundings	 as	 offering	 a	 disparate	 collection	 of	 actions.	 Instead	they	perceive	it	as	demanding	a	certain	form	of	behaviour’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	75,	emphasis	mine).	Here,	 it	 really	comes	 to	 the	 fore	how,	on	Merleau-Ponty’s	account	of	action,	the	perceptive	and	the	executive	dimension	of	agency	are	very	tightly	knit	together.	But,	as	we	have	sketched	it	so	far,	a	phenomenal	field	consists	in	several	perceived	opportunities	to	act:	at	any	tx,	 I	thus	perceive	a	number	of	different	opportunities	at	once.	Clearly,	not	all	of	these	can	effectively	draw	me	into	action.	On	Merleau-Ponty’s	view,	I	will	take	up	those	invitations	for	action	which	solicit	me	most	strongly.	In	this	context,	Romdenh-Romluc	introduces	two	helpful	no-tions:	urgency	and	salience.	In	her	2011	book,	she	mentions	that	‘perceived	de-mands	for	action	differ	in	their	urgency’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	95).	It	is	those	demands	which	are	 ‘perceived	as	most	urgent’,	she	writes,	which	will	 ‘initiate	action’	(Romdenh-Romluc,	2011:	95).	In	a	2012	contribution	to	The	Oxford	Hand-






































































staying	indoors.	The	hypersalience	is	thus	not	restricted	to	one	specific	oppor-tunity	at	tx,	but	pertains	to	any	opportunity	at	tx	which	is	of	the	right	type.	Mary,	indeed,	lives	her	whole	life	taking	up	opportunities	of	this	type.	Hypersalient	op-portunities	for	Fred,	in	contrast,	only	include	opportunities	to	wash	his	hands,	and	this	at	specific	times.	Whenever	he	perceives	an	opportunity	of	this	type,	his	field	of	possible	action	becomes	extremely	narrow:	he	can	only	really	follow	his	compulsion.		We	now	have	an	 initial	sketch	of	what	 it	means	 for	a	 field	of	possible	action	to	freeze,	and	how	this	can	recurrently	happen	because	of	an	agent’s	per-






















for	example,	may	perceive	opportunities	to	conform	to	female	gender	norms	as	hypersalient,	such	that	breaking	these	norms	won’t	seem	like	a	viable	option.	Technically,	the	list	of	factors	influencing	our	perceptive	dispositions	–	which	 opportunities	 will	 tend	 to	 be	more	 or	 less	 salient	 for	 us	 –	 is	 endless.	Equally,	a	perceptive	disposition	to	perceive	certain	opportunities	as	hypersali-
































practical	reason	comes	in	after	perception:	once	the	agent,	through	sensation,	has	 taken	 in	 her	 current	 circumstances,	 practical	 reason	 figures	 out	 which	course	of	action	to	take,	in	light	of	the	agent’s	wishes.	On	my	proposal,	however,	practical	reason	can	influence	action	through	influencing	the	way	she	perceives	opportunities.	The	structure	of	action	generation	is	thus	as	follows:	
Practical	reason	à	sensation/perception	à	action62	






















very	much	 an	 agent	 acting	 though	 her	 own	will,	 nonetheless	makes	 compro-mised	choices	because	her	will	has	been	corrupted	by	her	practical	reason.	On	Augustine’s	model,	however,	we	could	not	explain	exactly	what	happens	here:	
how	could	practical	reason	corrupt	the	will?	We	thus	still	needed	an	explanation	for	how	practical	reason	could	cor-rupt	an	agent’s	will,	and	so	compromise	choice	without	her	will	being	bypassed.	The	beginnings	of	an	answer,	I	argued,	can	be	found	in	Foucault’s	account	of	dom-






this	notion,	 I	 constructed	a	more	robust	account	of	possibility	 fields	and	how	they	can	freeze:	in	a	fourth	chapter,	I	drew	on	Merleau-Ponty	to	further	elaborate	this	 idea.	 On	 the	 interpretation	 I	 advanced,	 a	 frozen	 field	 of	 possible	 action	means	that	a	perceived	opportunity	is	hypersalient	for	an	agent,	such	that	alter-native	opportunities	seem	unviable	to	her.	I	argued	that	this	can	happen	in	a	variety	of	ways.	One	such	way,	then,	is	what	I	would	call	self-oppression.	Practical	reason,	when	it	becomes	oppressive,	has	precisely	this	effect	on	the	agent’s	field	of	possible	action.	It	has	the	power	to	 change	 the	way	she	perceives	possibilities:	when	 it	becomes	oppressive,	 it	tends	to	render	certain	types	of	possibility	hypersalient.	As	such,	in	self-oppres-sion,	the	agent’s	will	is	often,	sometimes	even	continually,	corrupted	by	her	own	practical	reason.	We	thus	arrive	at	our	final	hypothesis:	
in	hyperkrasia,	an	agent’s	practical	reason	influences	her	perception	of	
possibilities,	such	that	it	tends	to	freeze	her	field	of	possible	action,	thus	corrupt-









































not	suggesting	that	all	people	diagnosed	with,	or	portraying	symptoms	of,	ano-rexia	should	be	considered	self-oppressive.	Nor	do	I	wish	to	suggest	that	these	symptoms,	even	if	they	indicate	a	self-oppressive	style	of	agency,	cannot	be	un-derstandable	 responses	 to	 both	 personal	 and	 societal	 challenges.	 Anorexia	 is	very	often	a	coping	mechanism.	Though	its	name	may	suggest	otherwise,	self-oppression	does	not	mean	that	the	self-oppressive	agent	is	in	any	way	to	blame	for	her	condition.	This	holds	true	for	all	cases	of	self-oppression,	and	perhaps	especially	so	for	cases	of	anorexia	which	seem	to	feature	self-oppression.		Another	thing	to	note,	in	light	of	this	case	study,	is	that	the	pool	of	agents	diagnosed	with	anorexia	is	internally	very	diverse.	Diagnostic	criteria	group	to-gether	a	wide	variety	of	patients,	many	of	whom	manifest	very	differing	config-urations	of	agency.	This	becomes	apparent	when	studying	individual	cases:	de-spite	 the	 obvious	 overlap	 in	 symptoms,	 many	 subtle	 differences	 emerge	 in	




different	diagnosed	agents,	and	even	within	the	same	agent	during	the	course	of	the	condition.	 I	have,	 in	my	case	study,	described	some	 features	which	are	of	common	occurrence	in	those	diagnosed	with	anorexia.	This	does	not	imply,	how-ever,	that	all	agents	diagnosed	with	this	condition	exemplify	those	very	features.		Lastly,	I	have	not	constructed	any	deeper	psychological	explanation	as	to	why	Sam,	in	my	example,	developed	anorexia.	The	underlying	causes	of	ano-rexia	are	the	subject	of	much	debate	and	controversy.66	It	is	likely	that,	within	any	individual,	the	causes	of	the	condition	are	both	manifold	and	complex,	and	that	causes	are	quite	diverse	across	different	 individuals.	My	aim	is	merely	to	sketch	a	 certain	kind	of	behaviour,	 a	 style	of	 self-regulation,	which	 is	 at	 least	common	in	those	diagnosed	with	the	condition	–	regardless	of	its	underlying	ae-tiology.	Sam	is	an	18-year-old	student,	who	is	in	her	first	year	of	University.	She	studies	History	and	is	immensely	thrilled	to	do	so.	Her	weight	is	fairly	average,	and	she	is	not	very	concerned	about	her	appearance.	Nonetheless,	a	Summer	Ball	is	coming	up	in	a	few	months,	and	she	wants	to	lose	some	pounds	to	fit	in	her	dream	dress.	She	reads	in	a	magazine	that	cutting	out	carbs	is	an	efficient	way	to	lose	 weight,	 and	 so	 she	 decides	 to	 do	 so	 until	 Summer	 Ball	 comes.	 She	still	































finds	ever	more	intricate	opportunities	to.	This	definitely	seems	to	be	the	case	for	Sam:	opportunities	to	further	her	goal	of	weight	loss	almost	continually	fea-ture	on	her	phenomenal	field.	In	almost	every	situation,	there	is	something	that	she	must	do.	 Insofar	as	she	cannot	but	do	so,	other	opportunities	will	 remain	behind	a	perceptive	barrier:	she	may	be	offered	some	sweets	by	a	 friend,	she	may	be	sat	in	a	café	where	salted	nuts	are	placed	on	the	table,	she	may	feel	tired	as	her	alarm	goes	off	in	the	early	morning,	in	time	for	her	morning	run,	and	see	the	snooze	button	on	her	phone.	Sam,	however,	will	not	perceive	these	possibil-ities	as	viable,	even	though	she	perceives	them.	This	also	holds	for	more	signifi-cant	opportunities:	for	example,	both	her	academic	life	and	her	social	life	suffer	from	her	condition.	Her	field	of	possible	action	is	thus	continually,	or	almost	con-tinually,	 frozen.	We	can	see	how,	as	a	result,	Sam’s	anorexia	has	a	very	wide-spread	effect	on	her	overall	agency.		














rendering	this	one	possibility	viable,	against	the	odds,	because	he	felt	like	he	had	to	do	 it	–	because	all	 alternative	possibilities,	which	 implied	not	doing	 it,	 just	didn’t	seem	viable	to	him.	Or	perhaps,	once	he	put	so	much	effort	 into	 it,	at	a	certain	point	not	climbing	El	Cap	became	unviable	for	him:	perhaps	changing	his	perception	of	this	one	possibility,	 in	order	to	make	it	viable,	made	him	feel	so	invested	in	it	that	he	felt	he	couldn’t	but	take	it	up	in	action.	But	this	does	not	seem	to	be	the	case.	This	is	already	apparent	in	the	way	he	speaks	about	the	project.	For	example,	at	the	beginning	of	the	documentary,	he	states	that	free	soloing	the	El	Cap	might	just	not	be	for	him:	
































categories.		In	addition,	I	have	demonstrated	that	this	model	of	hyperkrasia,	though	by	no	means	spelling	out	any	necessary	or	sufficient	conditions,	can	be	used	as	a	tool	to	detect	self-oppression,	and	distinguish	it	from	forms	of	agency	which	are	formally	quite	similar.	To	this	end,	I	have	spelled	out	some	tell-tale	signs	of	hy-perkrasia.	 These	 are	 not	 necessary	 conditions,	 but	 strong	 indications	 that	 an	agent	is	self-oppressive.	Most	notably,	hyperkrasia	can	lead	practical	reason	to	sabotage	its	own	workings:	an	agent	may	want	or	decide	to	act	against	a	certain	principle,	yet	 find	herself	unable	 to.	Another	common	effect	of	hyperkrasia	 is	that	the	end	(or	set	of	ends)	on	which	the	agent	is	fixated	takes	over	her	life:	both	because,	whenever	she	sees	an	opportunity	to	further	this	end,	she	usually	can-not	but	take	it	up	and	so	disregard	her	other	valued	ends;	and	because	the	agent	tends	to	find	ever	more	opportunities	to	do	so.	This	project	has	aimed	to	contribute	to	the	philosophy	of	action	by	spec-ifying	the	existence	of	a	specific	form	of	agency,	which	closely	resembles	some	other	forms,	yet	which	also	seems	significantly	different.	In	doing	so,	I	have	also	offered	an	explanation	of	how	choice	can	arguably	be	compromised	through	the	exercise	of	one’s	own	agency.	But	beyond	this	merely	academic	aim,	this	thesis	also	hopes	to	contribute	to	our	general	understanding	of	human	agency	in	all	its	odd	and	complex	configurations.	Hopefully,	 the	category	of	hyperkrasia	helps	
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